The Influence Of Random Reaction Strategy And External Environment On The Evolution Of Social Dilemma Games

The essence of social dilemma is the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality.Theindividual pursues the maximization of his own interests,which leads to the collective expected interest is not maximized.Evolutionary game theory is a combination of biological evolution and game theory.It examines the evolutionary trends of strategies and is widely used in the areas of group behavior and social norms.In the group's social dilemma game,it is of great significance to study the factors to promote group cooperation for understanding group behavior and solving social dilemmas.Firstly,the prisoner's dilemma is studied based on the repeated game of bounded rationality group.This paperproposes a stochastic response strategy with two phases,and establishes a correspondingrepeated prisoner's dilemma game model.The simulation shows that the second-phase stochastic response strategy obviously improves the cooperation level of the group compared with the classical random response strategy for the previous round.Moreover,in this case,the group's overall average payment can be improved in most cases.Secondly,this dissertation proposes the external influence mechanism of individuals in a group and sets up two different external environmental impact models:linear impact model and exponential impact model.Meanwhile,it still establishesaprisoner's dilemma evolutionary game model in networks and also performs simulation analysis in a variety of complex network environments.The simulation results show that the external environment has a significant positive effect on the improvement of the community cooperation level,and it is effective in all kinds of simulated network environments.This paper systematically analyzes howto form an expected cooperation — to ensure the compliance management of institutions under the premise of reducing the cost of supervision—by establishing the social dilemma game model of certification bodies and regulatory agencies and using evolutionary game theory.The results of the evolution analysis show that it is possible to reduce the probability of strict supervision by increasing the punishment of the violations for certification authorities,which also indicates that the external environment of the certifiedindividuals in the group influences the cooperation.The research of this paper indicates that,on the basis ofgroup's non-complete rationality,whether the individual's consideration of the past multi-phase strategies plays an important role in affecting the level and benefit of group cooperation,and the influence of the individual's external environment on their own strategies also significantly increases the cooperative frequency of the group as a whole.Therefore,the externalenvironment for decision-making is also an important factor affecting cooperation.