Game Analysis Of Emergency Resource Allocation Among Heterogeneous Agents Under Different Rescue Modes

In recent years,various types of emergencies have occurred frequently.After the disaster,the emergency support department needs to make timely response and arrangements for emergencies,especially the allocation of emergency resources in the short-term after the event.If the area affected by the emergency is wide,there may be an imperative requirement for the same rescue resources in different regions,which leads to competition between different regions.In this context,how the emergency support departments in different regions can better respond to emergencies is an important research direction.This paper builds a research scenario based on real emergency cases.The research object is two different disaster-affected areas and a single rescue supplier.We analyze how multiple heterogeneous agents implement an effective resource allocation by considering whether the supplier has different unit price standards for the two regions or whether the supplier allows the rescue resources to be shared between the two disaster areas.Specifically,we separately construct the goals of the supplier and the governments,and constructed the Stackelberg model under different rescue modes.On this basis,we analyze the three-party game of the central government as a third-party participant and explore the optimal strategy of heterogeneous agents and analyze the theoretical analysis with the example simulation to draw some management inspiration for decision makers.The research results show:(1)In some scenarios,the supplier tends to choose to provide all rescue resources to only one disaster area.For example,in the distribution mode,the demand in the two affected areas is significantly different.In the sharing mode,the common aspiration of cooperation among the disaster areas is weak or the difference is strong.Under the scenario that the cooperation intention of each disaster area is certain,the supplier will make different decisions according to the willingness of the disaster area: When the sum of willingness is weak or the willingness in each area is proportional to the comprehensive demand intensity of resources(including demand,competitive will and willingness to cooperate),the allocation model is selected.Otherwise,the disaster areas are encouraged to share resources.(2)The total amount of rescue resources applied by the disaster-stricken governments to the supplier changes with the supply: Under the small supply constraints,the actual application volume in the disaster area must be greater than the supply;while under the relatively abundant supply,the governments often directly determines the application based on the supply.In order to achieve emergency rescue more effectively,it is recommended that the governments of the disasterstricken areas pay attention to explore the horizontal cooperation mode in the normal management activities.(3)For the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of the overall emergency rescue,the central government can introduce some contract incentive measures to enhance the enthusiasm of horizontal cooperation in different disaster areas,and prompt providers to choose a more humanitarian sharing model.Ultimately,effective emergency response is formed and social satisfaction is improved.