Research On Pricing And Coordination Of Double Hybrid Channel Supply Chain Under Retailer’s Fair Concern

With the development of high-tech information technology,consumers’ shopping methods have been transformed and upgraded.E-commerce is also favored by more and more enterprises because of its low operating costs,simple transaction process,and borderless transaction locations.In order to attract more consumers,many manufacturers have introduced online channels on the basis of traditional retail channels,such as Lenovo,Nike,etc.Faced with strong manufacturers controlling wholesale prices and online direct sales channels,retailers are considering opening up their own online channels or using third-party online platforms for online sales.On the other hand,they take advantage of physical stores’ closer proximity to consumers and rely on the provision of services to grab market share.In this way,a double hybrid channel supply chain structure is formed,in which the manufacturer has online and offline channels,and the retailer also has online and offline channels.Because of the existence of this double hybrid channel supply chain,price competition between channels has become more intense.In addition,more and more experimental studies prove that when people make decisions,they not only pay attention to their absolute interests,but also their own relative interests,that is,there is a tendency of fair concern.Therefore,the fair concerns of members of the supply chain,especially the fair concerns of retailers,have a significant impact on both parties’ pricing strategies.Based on the above background,this article introduces the retailer’s fair concerns into the research of double hybrid channel supply chain decision-making,in which both sides of the supply chain have their own online channels,and retailers provide value-added services to consumers in traditional channels.Using game theory and optimization theory,this paper analyzes the pricing and coordination issues of retailers in two different situations: fair neutrality and fair concern,and discusses the impact of retailer’s service level and fair concern behavior on supply chain decision-making.The main research conclusions are as follows:Firstly,under the retailer’s fairness neutrality,the pricing models of centralized and decentralized decision-making for double hybrid channel supply chain are studied separately,and the optimal pricing,optimal sales volume,and optimal profit of each supply chain member in the corresponding channels are given.The results found that: under decentralized decision-making,when the retailer’s service level is within a certain range,the price and sales volume of each channel are positively related to it;beyond a certain range,there is no necessary relationship;for the entire supply chain,the profit of centralized decision-making is higher than that of decentralized pricing.Obviously,decentralized decisions reduce efficiency of supply chain.Secondly,under the retailer’s fair concern,the pricing strategies of the manufacturer without considering its fairness and considering its fairness are studied separately.The study found that: the impact of services on the supply chain is consistent under the two pricing models,and services have a positive effect on all prices;they have a negative effect on the retailer’s online channel sales and a positive effect on the sales of the other two channels.In the model where the manufacturer does not consider retailer’ fair concerns,its fair concern behavior will not affect the counterpart’s wholesale price and direct sales price,but excessive attention to this behavior will drive its own online and offline retail prices to rise;in addition,the retailer’s sales in both channels are negatively related to the fair concern coefficient;the direct sales volume of manufacturers is positively related.In the model where the manufacturer consider retailer’s fair concerns,the three retail prices are not related to the fair concern coefficient;the wholesale price is negatively related to the fair concern coefficient;and the sales volume of all channels have nothing to do with it.By comparing the two pricing models,it is found that the result of manufacturers pay attention to retailers’ fair concerns is better,regardless of the profits of individual decision makers or the profits of the supply chain system.Finally,two pricing contracts were used to coordinate the model that manufacturer did not consider the retailer’s fair concern behavior firstly,and then the revenue sharing contract was used to coordinate the model with manufacturers considering the fair concerns of retailers.At the same time,in order to verify the validity of the coordination conclusion,numerical simulation was used to realize Pareto optimization.This paper studies the pricing and coordination of enterprises in the double hybrid channel supply chain,which can achieve optimal allocation of resources and reduce conflicts between channels.It provides corresponding reference suggestions for the pricing and coordination strategies of enterprises in the double hybrid channel supply chain,which has certain theoretical and practical significance.