Real-time Pricing Game Analysis Of Smart Grid Based On Demand Response From The Perspective Of Advertising

Smart grid is the main direction of future power system development.Different from the traditional power grid,it integrates high-performance information transmission and analysis equipment,which can optimize the allocation of power resources and improve the stability of the power system.One of the important means for smart grid to realize the above functions is demand response,and real-time pricing is the main research direction of demand response.Previous researches on real-time pricing in the field of smart grid mostly focus on the response of users to the electricity price or the way that power retailers adjust the load of users through the electricity price.There are few researches on real-time pricing that takes the competition among power retailers for obtaining more users into consideration.In this dissertation,advertising is combined with real-time pricing problem in the competitive environment of the electricity market.An advertising differential game model is established to describe how power retailers compete for users.At the same time,a noncooperative game model is established to study the real-time pricing problem of power retailers in continuous time.The first chapter introduces the research background,research status,research content and the significance of the topic.In the second chapter,based on the premise of unified pricing of power retailers,a Stackelberg game model with one leader and several followers is established to describe the strategic interaction between power retailers and users.The case that users have budget constraint and case that users don not have budget constraint are discussed respectively to study the real-time pricing problem.Then,a Stackelberg game model with multiple leaders and multiple followers is designed to study the situation that each retailer sets their own electricity price in the third chapter.Finally,clean energy factor is added to the model in the fourth chapter.Under the assumption that users have the awareness of environmental protection,a Stackelberg game model between the power retailers and the users is established to redo the real-time pricing problem.This dissertation use Pontryagin maximization principle to solve the Nash equilibrium of advertisement differential game among power retailers.After combining it with the solution of the user side optimization problem,the Stackelberg equilibrium(or traditional Nash equilibrium)between the retailers and users is obtained.The pricing strategies and advertising strategies of power retailers under different conditions are simulated by numerical simulation.And the sensitivity analysis is used to study the influence of unit advertising cost on payment,pricing,number of users and user load.The simulation shows that:(1)The maximum payment and electricity price of each retailer in equilibrium does not always increase or decrease monotonously with the increase of his advertising cost parameter.This relationship can be represented by a piecewise function.(2)The influence of advertising cost parameter on the maximum payment and electricity price is obviously different in different segments.(3)For electricity retailers,the gap in advertising with other retailers has a greater impact on his maximum payment than the level of his own advertising investment.(4)After the clean energy enters the smart grid,the purchase intensity of clean energy by users is far greater than that of thermal power,which reflects the role of users' environmental awareness.