| With the continuous emergence of sharing economy,crowdsourcing contest has gradually become an important way of open innovation.In the multi-stage crowdsourcing contest,the seeker maximize their benefits by providing different forms of information feedback strategies to the solver.The content elements,types and effects of information feedback in crowdsourcing contest promote the innovation of business models and the rise of new industries.The main goal of this paper is to build a model by game theory,and to use MATLAB software to carry out simulation experiments.From the perspective of reverse auctions,this paper discusses the effects of different feedback strategies in crowdsourcing contest,and discusses the optimal information feedback strategies in different stages of crowdsourcing contest,so as to provide theoretical basis for seeker and solver.In this paper,the first and second phases of crowdsourcing contest are respectively researched on information feedback strategies.In the first phase,a game model is constructed and whether the answerer honestly feeds back quality attribute information and whether the seeker verifies the feedback information of the solver to find the balance between the two,and determine whether the quality attributes of the answerer should be fed back and the corresponding seeker benefits.In the second stage,build a game model based on the Bertrand model,and explore the impact of the seeker’s complete feedback strategy and incomplete feedback strategy on both sides of the crowdsourcing after the first stage,and use MATLAB software to obtain simulation results.In addition,at the end of this article,from the perspective of the seeker and the answerer,some reasonable suggestions are put forward to make information feedback more efficient in crowdsourcing contest.The conclusions show that:(1)Before the crowdsourcing contest begins,the seeker should increase the efficiency of verifying the quality attributes of the answerer,strengthen the punishment of dishonesty,reduce the cost of the seeker’s verification and the extra benefits of the solver’s false feedback.When the number of heterogeneous answerers is unevenly distributed,the feedback quality attribute value will improve the efficiency of the seeker;while when the number of answerers is more evenly distributed,the non-feedback will make the seeker more effective.(2)During the crowdsourcing contest,when the ability distribution of the solver is more uniform,the seeker adopts a complete feedback strategy will cause the answerer to add more efforts;when the ability gap of the solver is too large,the seeker adopt the non-complete feedback strategy to enable the solver to submit solutions that meet the requirements of the seeker.(3)In order to maintain the efficiency of crowdsourcing contest,the seeker should pay attention to the honest guidance of the answerer,take into account the willingness of the answerer when selecting the information feedback strategy,choose the corresponding information feedback strategy according to the actual situation,construct a reward and punishment mechanism,clarify the various reward and punishment systems and strictly implement;the answerers should pay attention to integrity and strengthen capabilities,so that both parties can achieve a win-win situation. |
