A Bribery Game Analysis Based On Prospect Theory

This paper analyzes corrupt behavior through a modified bribery game.Harassment bribery games usually include an agent(public official)who demands a bribe,and a passive player(citizen)who accepts or rejects the offer.This experiment includes a new paradigm in which this passive player has the choice to offer a bribe.Moreover,previous studies have explored the relationship of probability of an audit on corrupt behavior.This study enhances the literature by testing for a possible inverted-U relationship,through three different audit probability points at the same level of expected payoff.Results show that:(1)there is an inverse relationship between corrupt behavior and probability levels for public officials,as predicted by prospective theory,(2)citizens respond equally to all three probability levels,suggesting rational behavior at the first stage of the game,(3)players are equally likely to accept or reject bribe offers,(4)gender and risk attitudes seem to affect how players perceive probabilities.