An Empirical Study Of The Enterprise's Inefficiency Investment By Equity Incentive

The principal-agent problem caused by the separation of corporate ownership and management,is the main reason for enterprises continue to emerge the inefficient investment behavior.The principal-agent theory believes that between principal shareholders and agent managers in information asymmetry and inconsistent interests,will affect investment decisions and corporate performance.The agency problem due to lack of investment or excessive investment behavior of Listed Companies in China's long-standing development(Qingquan Xing et al,2007).In this context,how to make managers to make more conducive to the development of the company's decision,is currently a focus of modern company theory,equity incentive as a kind of long-term incentive mechanism can solve this problem and promote reasonable investment managers directly(Jensen and Meckling,1976).Most researchers focus on equity incentive and corporate inefficient investment at present,from the perspective of TMT heterogeneity two Study on the relationship between the impact is relatively small.In the existing principal-agent theory,the research about the incentive mechanism of how to influence the inefficient investment of enterprises is based on the theory of new classical economics,the senior management team as homogeneous,which is obviously inconsistent with reality(Yawei Liu,2015).The upper echelons theory(Mason,1984)believes that because of gender,age,education,tenure and other differences the TMT behavioral choices with different.Therefore,this paper attempts to combine the heterogeneity of executive team,equity incentive and inefficient investment,from the perspective of heterogeneity of executive team,to study the impact of equity incentive on enterprise's non-efficient investment behavior,and try to expand the research in this field theoretically.In practice,it has guiding significance on how to restrain the inefficient investment and how to construct and optimize the executive team so that theequity incentive system can give full play to the governance role.On the basis of literature review,this paper analyzes the theoretical relationship among the heterogeneity of executive team,equity incentive and inefficient investment,and puts forward the corresponding assumptions,and adopts the metrological method.Through the empirical study of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of Listed Companies in 5 years 4757 observations,the inspection of the equity incentive effect on non efficiency investment behavior of enterprises,and in consideration of TMT heterogeneity under the background of the relationship between the two regulation.The result shows that equity incentive can restrain enterprise excessive investment,promote the investment shortage;relationship between the degree of heterogeneity of TMT equity incentive and corporate inefficient investment plays a negative regulatory role;the relationship between TMT tenure heterogeneity of equity incentive and the non efficiency investment plays a positive regulatory role;the relationship between TMT age and gender heterogeneity of equity incentive and corporate inefficient investment had no effect.Finally,according to the above research results,we put forward the targeted policy recommendation from the aspects of promoting the implementation of enterprise equity incentive system and strengthening the construction of senior management team.