An Empirical Study On The Impact Of Ownership Structure And Equity Incentive On Inefficient Investment

The coordinated development of beijing-tianjin-hebei has made the economy of Beijing,tianjin and hebei to be a more balanced and all-round development and ascend.Listed companies of Beijing-tianjin-hebei can be said to be the representative of the excellent enterprises,the development of public companies is closely related to the local economic level and environment,so the performance of local enterprises also affects the regional development.The Investment determines the enterprise's development and growth,also represents the strength of the enterprise.From the investment point of view,some enterprises will spare money to worthy projects effectively,solving some enterprise financing demand,more efficient allocation of social resources at the same time,and promote its value for the enterprise.Improving the management efficiency and effectiveness of enterprise is the goal of the company of all stakeholders together.The importance of investment efficiency is that it reflects the efficiency and effectiveness of management.On account of multifarious reasons,the enterprise investment is not completely effective.It happens from time to tome,such as excessive investment in the project whose net present value is less than zero or to give up the program whose net present value is greater than zero,so a company will appear overinvestment or underinvestment,saying inefficient investment.The factors that affect the efficiency of investment are different,and there are a lot of the research achievements on the issue.Based on the listed companies as samples of the beijing-tianjin-hebei region,this article mainly studys the relationship of equity incentive and inefficient investment,as also as the effect of ownership structure on the inefficient investment.In the enterprise,especially the public company,the company's investment decision-making is decided by senior management,however,there is the uncertainty of success and failure if the CEO has investment behavior.Stock option is one of the methods on the study of corporate governance issues for management,in order to prompte the company and maximize shareholders' interests,when making a decision.The existence of multiple variables of ownership structure is the balance of ownership and control,the ultimate goal of which is to inspire the CEO with the identity of shareholders to a common starting point,as much as possible to achieve common interests,so as to maximize the company benefit.From the results of this paper,I found that in the sample company,the frequency of the implementation of stock option mechanism is not high,but the equity incentive can restrain the inefficient investment to some extent.This article uses equity concentration,institution equity and management equity as the three factors of ownership structure.Although it's different about their effect on the efficiency of investment,on the whole,effective distribution of reasonable proportion can improve the efficiency of the listed company investment problem to a certain extent.If listed companies really wants to constraint the behavior of inefficient investment,they need to begin from many aspects,including internal and external governance and system,etc.