The Research On The Regulation Of The Price And Non-price Behavior Of E-commerce Platform

In the background of the rise,popularization and continuous development of the mobile Internet,e-commerce platform has been widely used in the public field of vision.After nearly twenty years of development,the e-commerce platform enterprise is gradually mature and plays a more and more important role in the market economy.However,the market order of e-commerce platform has not been effectively standardized at the same time in its rapid development,so there are some market behaviors that are not conducive to benign competition in the process of development.Different from the asymmetric pricing,tying and information behavior of the traditional market,the e-business platform has its own characteristics,such as the externality of the bilateral market platform network,the complementarity of the demand,and the difference between the operating mechanism and the traditional market,and the relative lag in the theory of industrial regulation and the construction of the policy.Therefore,how the government should understand and regulate the behavior of the e-business platform enterprises to form a good market competition order is one of the important topics that the academic circles need to study.Based on the related theories of bilateral market,this paper focuses on the price behavior of e-commerce platform and the regulation of non price behavior with tying and information as an example.It mainly adopts the methods of literature research,theoretical model research and case study,and supports each other.This paper first summarizes the theoretical system about the bilateral market of e-commerce platform at home and abroad,and then summarizes the development status of e-commerce platform from the perspective of e-commerce industry.Secondly,through the establishment of an economic model,the pricing and tying behavior of the e-business platform under two kinds of monopoly and competition are analyzed.The social welfare is calculated and compared,and the formation mechanism and regulation strategy of the "lemon" problem in the e-commerce platform are analyzed.It is found that the competitive market of the e-commerce platform is higher than the Lerner Index in the monopoly market.The asymmetric price structure is carried out in the two markets.It should be a proper behavior.It should change the key point of regulation.The e-business platform enterprises take the tying strategy,whether the monopoly or the competition,and the traditional unilateral market.To improve the total utility of the buyer,the total utility of the seller and the general welfare of the society;the new information asymmetry and the principal-agent problem are the main causes of the "lemon" problem of the electronic commerce platform.Finally,according to the definitionand analysis of the above e-commerce platform’s price and non price behavior,we put forward several policy recommendations on how to regulate the market and government means comprehensively.