A Study On The Relationship Between The Stakeholders Of Debt-to-Equity Swaps In Stated-Owned Enterprises

As a kind of government intervention and financial innovation,debt-to-equity swap plays an important role in resolving bank non-performing assets and reducing the corporate sector leverage.In recent years,China's economic development has entered a new normal.Faced with new challenges such as the high degree of leverage in the corporate sector,the sharp increase in non-performing assets of banks,the overcapacity in traditional industries,the aggravation in economic and financial risks,the government begins to implement a new round of debt-to-equity swap.Compared with the previous round,this new round emphasizes the role of market,with a larger scale and a more complex situation.How to promote the implementation of this round swap effectively is an urgent problem to be solved.By introducing game theory and agency theory,this paper analyzes the relationship among stakeholders during debt-to-equity swap in state-owned enterprises by qualitative and quantitative analysis methods.Concretely,the theoretical basis of the operation of debt-to-equity swap is discussed at first.Next,this paper mainly studies the necessity,difficulties and differences in the implementation of this round after the investigation and analysis of the history and state of debt-to-equity swap.This paper then analyzes the characteristics,strategies and the information structure of stakeholders in this round.By analyzing the behavior choices of stakeholders under different conditions,this paper tries to construct an overall game framework in this round.Based on that,an interactive game analysis is conducted among commercial banks,state-owned enterprises and implementing agencies.This paper analyzes issues such as the selection of implementing agencies,the operation after the transfer of shares,the allocation of control rights and the decision on the withdrawal of shares through the establishment of a simple game model.The result shows that:(1)we should pay attention to the selection of implementing agencies in this round of debt-to-equity swap.In this selection,when banks choose to implement debt-to-equity swap to special-mentioned loans and normal loans,especially inter-bank cross swap,the swap companies will be inclined to choose those bank affiliated institutions as swap agencies since it has more advantages in bargaining.(2)In theory,debt-to-equity swap firms and implementing agencies can achieve the optimal decision of equity allocation and withdrawal by signing a conversion agreement based on corporate income and value.However,in reality,there may be a way in which one party chooses an effective exit while the other party chooses an invalid one.Here the control should be transferred to the effective party to achieve the optimal decision.Finally,from the practice of the new round swap,combined with the experience of developed market countries,this paper proposes to improve the relevant measures and policies to ensure the smooth running of this round swap mainly from implementing the principle of legalization and marketization,perfecting the related system on the operation of debt to equity and establishing a market-oriented operation and management system of debt to equity,Including:improving the relevant laws,regulations and security system;innovating the sources channel of funding,fully mobilizing the enthusiasm of social capital;perfecting the corporate governance structure of debt-for-equity enterprises,optimizing the internal control rights;establishing and improving the matching measures to protect the equity Market-oriented exit.