| At present,China's economy is undergoing a special period of transition.The government's intervention in the economy is still relatively serious.State-owned enterprises generally adopt the state-controlled equity model,and government and enterprises have not yet been truly separated.In this asymmetric reform process,the government's highly centralized control over enterprises provides the government with the goal of transferring its own public governance goals to enterprises.The direct consequence of this is that governments have a strong will to intervene investment activities of state-owned enterprises within their jurisdiction at all levels,inefficient investment issues are prominent.The use of the Pyramid equity structure in state-owned enterprises allows the state to decentralize decision-making power to corporate management in a decentralized manner without changing the property rights of state-owned enterprises,and raises management's discretion in the disclosure of social responsibility information.Improving investment efficiency by increasing the flexibility of operations.This article is based on the background of China's economic transition,the government's excessive intervention in the state-owned enterprises,and the proliferation of non-efficient investment by enterprises.Based on the analysis of government intervention theory,stakeholder theory,information asymmetry theory,and principal-agent theory,the central and local governments are used.Select the central and local government state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the 670 listed companies as the research object,use descriptive statistics,total sample regression and stratified sample regression analysis to test the proposed hypothesis with the data from 2012 to 2016.The empirical results show that pyramid equity structures serve as a credible commitment to limit government intervention in management decisions in the full sample.With the increase of pyramid level,the investment efficiency of enterprises has been improved significantly;Social responsibility information disclosure can improve the investment efficiency of enterprises by reducing moral risk and adverse selection;Pyramid hierarchy plays a significant positive role in the positive relationship between CSR disclosure and investment efficiency.Further analysis of sample enterprises by central and local control shows that:the significance level of pyramid hierarchy and enterprise investment efficiency in the sample group of central enterprises is smaller than that of local state-owned enterprises.That is,in local state-owned enterprises,the decentralization of power by local governments through pyramid hierarchy is more conducive to avoiding inefficient investment and improving the efficiency of enterprise investment.Although the corporate social responsibility disclosure and investment efficiency are equally significant in the sample group of central enterprises and the sample group of local state-owned enterprises,the influence of CSR disclosure in sample group of central enterprises on investment efficiency is greater than that local state-owned enterprises.Compared with central enterprises,the pyramid hierarchy of local state-owned enterprises plays a more significant positive role in the positive relationship between CSR information disclosure and investment efficiency.Finally,based on the research conclusion of this paper,the paper puts forward policy Suggestions to improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises and improve the disclosure of social responsibility information from two perspectives of the government and enterprises.It is suggested that deepen the reform in an all-round way to reduce government intervention and state-owned enterprises should be encouraged to improve the level of disclosure of social responsibility information.The introduction of market competition mechanisms and social responsibility management and the standardization of disclosure. |
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