Information Sharing Model In A Co-opetitive Supply Chain

With the constant development of economy and intense competition,more and more contract manufacturers(CMs)not only improve their outsourcing ability for the original equipment manufacturers(OEMs)but also begin to produce their own products.The fact that CMs act as not only the upstream partner but also the downstream competitor to OEMs makes the co-opetitive supply chain problem become a popular topic in the theoretical research and business management fields.At the same time,with the development of economic globalization,the market environment has evolved to be increasingly complex.Rapid technological change and an abundance of product configurations mean that the demand in industries is frequently volatile and difficult to forecast.With the advance of information technology,enterprises begin to use their own market data to obtain information about product demand and share the information about the market demand to improve the accuracy of the forecast for the market demand.Thus the study based on the information sharing model in a co-opetitive supply chain has important theoretical and practical significance.This paper employs game theory as main tool,uses the method of the combination of quantitative and qualitative method and set up different game models to study the problem of information sharing in a supply chain with an OEM and a CM,where the CM acts as not only upstream partner but also downstream competitor to the OEM.This paper also studies how to design the contract based on the principal-agent theory to make information sharing equilibrium reached.The main works are as follows :(1)Considering the situation where the OEM often dominants in the market,this paper set up the Stackelberg information sharing model.According to the two different scenarios where the wholesale price is given by the market and the wholesale price is decided by the CM,the paper separately studies the information sharing problem in the Stackelberg model.First,by introducing dynamic game,the Stackelberg information sharing models set up on the basis of two different pricing methods of wholesale price.According to comparing equilibrium results of different game,our analysis shows that the enterprise first to decide the market decision should choose information sharing,but the later decision-making enterprise should choose not to share the information because information asymmetry.This paper puts forward the advice that the enterprise should make the information sharing decision according to the decision order.Secondly,considering of the supply chain coordination,according to the total profit maximization principle,the contract is designed to induce the information sharing and the wholesale price contract is optimized to prevent the transmission of false information.According to numeral simulation,our analysis shows that the OEM should choose the scenario where the wholesale price is given by the market,but the CM should choose the scenario where the wholesale price is decided by itself.(2)Considering the situation where the OEM and the CM compete fiercely,this paper set up the Cournot information sharing model.According to the two different scenarios where the wholesale price is given by the market and the wholesale price is decided by the CM,the paper separately studies the information sharing problem in the Cournot model.First,according to the duopoly competition situation,the Cournot information sharing models set up on the basis of two different pricing methods of wholesale price.According to comparing equilibrium results of different game,our analysis shows that when the wholesale price is decided by the market,the information sharing decision is related to the market fluctuations,the prediction accuracy and the substitutability of the products,but when the wholesale price is decided by the CM,the CM benefits from information sharing and the OEM not.This paper puts forward the advice that the enterprise should make the information sharing decision according to the decision order and the relationship between the factors.Secondly,considering of the supply chain coordination,according to the total profit maximization principle,the contract is designed to induce the information sharing.Our analysis shows that when the wholesale price is decided by the market,information sharing will aggravate the double marginal effect hurt the whole supply chain.According to numeral simulation,our analysis shows that the OEM should choose the scenario where the wholesale price is given by the market,but the CM should choose the scenario where the wholesale price is decided by itself.The study extends the scope of research in the field of information and the results can be used as the basis of decision-making for operating and managing the co-opetitive supply chain with the CM as a downstream rival of its OEM and provides this kind of enterprises with scientific reference basis about information sharing in daily production.