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New Institutional Economics Analysis Of Urban Public Bicycle System

Posted on:2018-11-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J B ZhengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330536955930Subject:Regional Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Public bicycles because of its low-carbon,efficient and healthy green properties,making it a pivotal role for the construction of low-carbon traffic,improving the urban environment,and easing the traffic congestion.Its development and popularization is an inevitable demand to build a resource-Environment-friendly society.In this paper,the public bicycle system is divided into pile public bicycle system and no pile-free public bicycle system.Pile public bicycle system is supported by the government,pile-free public bicycle system refers to the market share bicycles which appear recently.There is information asymmetry phenomenon in the pile public bicycle system and the pile-free public bicycle system.And the problems are different in each kind of bicycle system.Here we analyze the two from the new institutional economics in the principal and the incomplete contract perspective.In the pile public bicycle system,the public bicycle service mainly involves the three main actors of the public,the government and the operation enterprise,and there has two principal-agent relationship among them.In the hidden relationship between the public and the government,the public is too fragmented to monitor the government's incentives,and the government has the tendency to expand the scale to take up more resources.In the relationship between the government and the enterprise,because of the difference between the two functions,they will have different opinions about the amount of the subsidy.Enterprises as a message advantage side has a "rip" motive,in order to obtain more subsidies from the government.To solve these problems of information asymmetry,this paper has analyzed and discussed,and put forward the relevant measures to solve them.In the pile-free public bicycle system,the enterprise is self-financing and bear the risk alone.Unlike the pile public bicycle system,the three-party principal-agent relationship disappears,it transforms to the direct market relationship between the firm and the consumer,the government serves as the maintainer and regulator of the market order.The public is no longer the government's principal,and the government is no longer the public's agent,the principal-agent relationship between the public and the government does not exist.Similarly,the relationship between the enterprise and the government also naturally disappeared,the government does not give the corporate subsidies any longer.In the operation process,the corporate signed a short-term lease contract with the customer in essence,the consumer is information advantaged of the party,and the enterprise is information disadvantaged.Consumers have the incentive to maximize their own interests in order to maximize their own interests,which will affect the profitability of the enterprise.After analyzing the profits of the enterprise,it was found that the abnormal rate of bicycle(caused by the consumer's default behavior)seriously affected the normal operation of the enterprise.Finally,giving some recommendations according to the above analysis,companies and governments need to take measures to reduce consumer damage to the enterprise,in order to promote the shared bicycle industry developing more better.
Keywords/Search Tags:public bike, new institutional economics, principal-agent, incomplete contract
PDF Full Text Request
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