| The level of enterprise investment efficiency is not only related to the level of the allocation of resources,but also related to the efficiency of their own business development.In financial management,the initial process of a series of business decisions is the decision-making of the enterprise’s investment activities.So the level of investment efficiency directly determines the ability of an enterprise to develop its own business empire.However,China’s market economy started late,the capital market still exists in all aspects of the problem.China’s government regulation of capital market lax,leading to China’s agency problems and information asymmetry is serious.Agent issues and information asymmetry and other issues specifically for the management of opportunistic behavior,these problems will lead to excessive investment in the emergence of enterprises.In China’s current economic slowdown,the market under the new normal situation,China’s investment in enterprises with blindness,listed companies generally have a radical investment behavior,and radical investment often lead to excessive investment.Investment decisions on the development of enterprises is very important,excessive investment will lead to enterprise resource allocation inequality,and even lead to a large number of cash on the market,there is inflation.In order to alleviate the excessive investment of listed companies in China,the actual investment level of enterprises is close to the expected optimal level,and the sustained and stable development of our enterprises is guaranteed.In the current era of information big bang,internal control and accounting conservatism can enhance the true reliability of accounting information.And the true and reliable information on corporate investment decision-making has a pivotal role,will help enterprises to abandon the radical investment projects.This paper starts with the two governance perspectives of internal control and accounting conservatism,and studies the degree of change of the impact of accounting conservatism on the impact of over-investment under the influence of internal control from the aspects of easing agent problem and information asymmetry.In this paper,through the combing of domestic and foreign literature,combined with the current hot issues,to determine the content and direction of this paper.And analyzes the influence of internal control on accounting conservatism and the reasons why the internal control and accounting conservatism may cause excessive investment from the theory of principal-agent and information asymmetry.In the definition of the concept,the role of agency and information asymmetry as a bridge,to understand the internal control of the role of accounting conservatism,accounting conservatism on the impact of excessive investment.Internal control and accounting conservatism as a different means of governance can be more effective to ease the information asymmetry and agency issues.Internal control can help enterprises to improve accounting conservatism,enhance the true reliability of enterprise information,thereby reducing the information asymmetry.The effective reduction of information asymmetry can significantly reduce the investment noise generated by the financing of the funds needed for investment.Starting from the internal control,this paper first studies the impact of internal control on accounting conservatism,and the impact of accounting conservatism on investment efficiency.And then in-depth study under the influence of internal control,accounting conservatism on the impact of investment efficiency will change.On the basis of the theory,this paper puts forward the hypothesis of this paper,designs the appropriate regression model to select the appropriate measure of metric measurement,and makes an empirical study on the relationship between the three.This paper makes an empirical study on A-share non-financial listed companies as a sample from 2013 to 2015.The KW model of domestic and foreign scholars’ preference is selected for the accounting conservatism measurement.The investment efficiency measure is used to denote the actual investment level and the expected investment level with residuals.Richardson model,the residuals obtained by the Richardson model regression,the magnitude of the positive residuals indicates the degree of overinvestment.This paper examines the effect of internal control on accounting conservatism,the inhibitory effect of accounting conservatism on overinvestment,and the influence of accounting conservatism on over-investment under the influence of internal control.May be due to China’s economic slowdown,China’s listed companies in order to improve investor confidence,the management in order to obtain more benefits and advocacy of our policy,the sample listed companies almost all of the excessive investment situation,only a small Some of the situation of insufficient investment.The results of empirical research show that the quality of internal control is negatively correlated with accounting conservatism,that is,with the improvement of internal control quality,accounting conservatism also increases.Accounting conservatism can reduce over-investment behavior.In the case of better internal control,accounting conservatism can better inhibit the excessive investment situation.The study also found that executive pay and investment were negatively correlated.Finally,according to the previous research results put forward the relevant policy recommendations.China’s government should pay attention to internal control,listed companies should be based on the actual situation of the company to improve their internal control,because the internal control can not only improve the authenticity of the quality of accounting information,but also to help the accounting robustness to curb excessive investment behavior.China’s government should pay attention to accounting conservatism,the development of China’s national conditions and the system of accounting prudence policy.At the same time listed companies should also be a reasonable design executive pay. |
