Research On Supply Chain Coordination Considering Participants' Risk Attitudes Under The System Auction Mechanism

Supply chain coordination has been the focus of discussion in supply chain management research.Only of supply chain enterprises based on effective and coordinate mode,can we share risks and revenue,so as to achieve maximum profits of the entire supply chain,which improves the competitiveness of the entire system.An auction provides an ideal mechanism for purchasers and suppliers in competitive markets.Auction mechanism has widely used parts in the procurement market,because it generates the participants' enthusiasm and facilitates the coordination of supply chain.In this paper,we consider a supply chain with two competitive suppliers providing identical products or service to a single retailer.Meanwhile,it is vitally necessary to take supply chain risk into account and develop a value-at-risk(VaR)method for determining supply chain risk–return trade-offs.This paper analyzes different coordinated mechanisms for the supply chain under the symmetric information situation and the asymmetric information situation.In this paper,we consider a simple situation where no complicated auction or contract mechanism is involved.Then we develop the Catalog Auction without contract coordination and the Two-Part Contract Auction and contracting mechanism.Under information symmetry and information asymmetry,this paper draws the following conclusions: For the channel coordination method,the retailer and the low-cost supplier work as a team to maximize the total profit of the supply chain,but 100% of the profit will go to the retailer,leaving no profit at all to the low-cost supplier.Whereas for the independent policy method,the low-cost supplier and the retailer both obtain their own profit,but total profit of the entire supply chain obtained by the independent policy method is lower than that obtained by the channel coordination method.The Catalog Auction method,total profit of the entire supply chain is higher than that of the independent policy method,but lower than that of channel coordination method.For the Two-Part Contract Auction method,the optimal values of the decision variables obtained by the auction and contracting mechanisms are exactly the same as the channel coordination optimums in certain circumstances.The profit can be shared between the retailer and the low-cost supplier and meanwhile,the retailer's profit and the low-cost supplier's profit can be improved under the two-part contract auction mechanism.