Research On Government Minimum Revenue Guarantee And Excess Benefit Allocation In PPP Project

With the community economy development,PPP project as a solution to the government financial pressure,the infrastructure project financing model gave birth.As the PPP project is running for a long time,the investment cost is high and the future income is uncertain.In order to attract social capital to participate in the smooth progress of the project,the government will share the project risk with investors by providing the minimum benefit of the project.But due to lack of experience,related research and many other reasons,making the PPP in practice there are two types of problems in the course of operation.The first is government provides the minimum amount of guarantee is too high,did not fully mobilize the enthusiasm of social capital operation and management.The second is to determine the proportion of the income distribution over the lack of scientific projects.For the two types of problems,this paper uses the theory of real option,through the B-S model,the study found that the drift rate of franchise project income is higher,the government franchise agreement actually contains a lot of options value,make up for the lack of traditional research methods.Decision makers have different risk preferences and risk management capabilities,therefore,have different risk preference.Establishing the Bargaining Game Model to Determine the Government ’s Minimum Income Guarantee.The VaR function is used to quantify the risk appetite of the government and the investor,and the minimum guaranteed demand of the different risk preference is determined.Taking into account the government can be in the case of better project to participate in the project over-income distribution,technical strength and management of strong investors,the higher the rate of return on capital.So you can give concession price,which is corresponding to the social marginal cost and the strength of the investors.And ultimately the demand indicators and price indicators will be combined to determine the minimum government revenue guarantee.The excess return distribution is based on the sharing of the risk of share sharing.Not taking into account when the actual needs of the project more and more close to the socialneeds of the saturation point when the investors need to pay the effort is doubled.When the balance of income is reached,investors will give up their efforts.If the government wants to further increase the social benefits of the project,the balance should be broken by incentives and punishment.Based on the government’s reciprocity preferences,the establishment of ladder-type excess return distribution method.