Executive Tenure,Successor Source And Budget Shirking

With the rapid development of the trend of economic globalization,the steady implementation of the strategy of "going out" of domestic enterprises and the steady progress of the "one side" idea have made the listed companies urgently want to improve the efficiency of internal management.As the cornerstone of management accounting Hansen,2003),the budget is also gaining increasing attention.In the liter ature,most scholars choose the budget of the transaction cost to describe the level of budget efficiency,that the hidden information caused by the "adverse selection"-budget loosening and hidden action led to the "moral hazard"-budget discharge responsibility for the representative of the budget Opportunism,which greatly increases the transaction costs of the budget process(Rankin,2008),is the "biggest drawback" that constrains the budgetary effect and compromises budget efficiency and forms the "negative efficiency" of the budget process(Elmassri,2011).The company executives as an important decision-making process in the business process,shoulder the mission to complete the budget objectives,the manager's term can be to some extent reflect the manager's business experience,cognitive level,risk tendency,way of thinking And work attitude(Shamsie,2001).The "term of office" of a manager is a classic academic issue that represents an important aspect of the agen cy conflict between the manager and the shareholder(Li Peizheng 2012).In the course of business operation,there is a principal-agent problem between managers and shareholders.When managers make decisions,they may consider their own interests m ore,rather than the interests of shareholders,which leads to the inefficiency of enterpr ise managers.The duration of the tenure of an enterprise manager will affect its decision to a certain extent,so managers will also influence managers in varying degrees to their shareholders' interests in different stages of their tenure,so that executives will show varying degrees of opportunism Tend to produce different levels of budget shirking behavior.However,based on the theory of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and high-level echelon theory,this paper adopts the empirical research method to study the relationship between high-level echelon theory and high-level echelon theory.The influence of the term of tenure on the responsibility of the budget,andon the basis of this,the author discusses the regulatory role of the successor source.Based on this article,3291 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen are listed as the research samples,and the measures of Shin and Kim(2002)on the shrinking of income budget are taken into account.At the same time,other factors influencing the budget discharge are controlled.For example,Cash flow and debt ratio,equity dispersion,growth opportunities,executive shareholding ratio,accounts receivable turnover rate,management fee rate,etc.,to explore the impact of executive tenure on budget shirking,and on this basis,the introduction of executive succession Source as a regulatory variable to examine the mechanism by which executives' tenure on budget shirking occurs at different sources.The conclusion of this paper shows that the first term is that the term of office is not a simple linear relationship,but rather an "inverted U-shaped" relationship.Secondly,the term and expectation of the executive The "inverted U" relationship is more pronounced.