A Study On State-owned Enterprises’ CEO Autonomy And Executives-employees Pay Gap

With CEO autonomy theory applied to executive-employee pay gap research constantly,it has become the mainstream research perspective.But for state-owned enterprises which have an important role in the national economy and people’s lives,with its own unique characteristics,how will CEO autonomy affect its executive-employee pay gap?It has not been fully documented yet.So,from the perspective of CEO autonomy theory,this paper explore the effect and motivation of listed state-owned enterprises’ CEO autonomy on executive-employee pay gap,then provide corresponding ideas for the formulation of CEO autonomy and remuneration policy.Additionally,based on the fact that technology intensity is largely different among sub-sectors of manufacturing industry,this paper uses technology intensity as the adjustment variable to explore how different the influence of CEO autonomy on executive-employee pay gap among sub-sectors is.Based on the systematic review of relevant theories and literatures,this paper puts forward the hypothesis of the influence mechanism of state-owned enterprises’ CEO autonomy on executive-employee pay gap.Then,this paper constructs the index system of CEO autonomy based on the published annual report,selects 371 manufacturing state-owned listed companies as the research object,chooses six years data from 2010 to 2015;the data qomes from CSMAR and company’s annual report,finally a total of 2226 valid data were used for analysis.The hypotheses are verified by normality test,correlation analysis,regression analysis,group comparison analysis and single sample T test methods.The results show that:(1)There is a significant positive correlation between state-owned enterprises’ CEO autonomy and executive-employee pay gap.(2)Executive-employee pay gap has a positive impact on corporate performance,which means the state-owned enterprises are applicable to the tournament theory;The interaction of CEO autonomy and executive-employee pay gap has a significant positive effect on corporate performance;There is a significant positive correlation between CEO autonomy and executive-employee pay gap performance sensitivity,but oppositely the relationship between CEO autonomy and executive-employee pay gap size sensitivity is negative correlation;CEO-employee autonomy gap is weakly related to executive-employee pay gap.The all above empirical results show that the state-owned enterprises’ CEO autonomy positively affect executive-employee pay gap out of the firm’s motivation.(3)The technology intensity adjusts the relationship between CEO autonomy and executive-employee pay gap positively.Then we do comparison research between low technology-intensive industries sub-sample and high technology-intensive industries sub-sample further.We find that the positive correlation between executive-employee pay gap and corporate performance,positive correlation between CEO autonomy and corporate performance,positive correlation between the interaction of CEO autonomy&executive pay gap and corporate performance,low technology-intensive industries sub-sample is all stronger than high technology-intensive industries sub-sample.But the positive correlation between CEO-employee autonomy gap and executive-employee pay gap,the former is weaker than the latter.The results show that CEO in low technology-intensive industries,his firm’s motivation is highly stronger than CEO in high technology-intensive industries.The study results show that,after the reform of market economy system,the state-owned enterprise pay system reforming has achieved good results.This study develops the content of CEO autonomy and executive compensation,enriches the existing research on the executive-employee pay gap of state-owned enterprises,and provides corresponding ideas for perfecting the corporate governance and optimizing the autonomy allocation and remuneration of state-owned enterprises.