Research On The Design Of Equity Incentive Scheme Of Shanghai Jahwa

The most modern enterprise adopts the mode of separation of ownership and management,which leads to the principal-agency relationship created,but the goals of shareholders and managers are always different,the conflict of two sides will make managers take short-sighted behaviors,which result conducive development of enterprises in long-term.Equity incentive has been a tool to reconcile the contradiction in the majority of enterprises.In the western countries,due to the market economy developed,and equity incentive system is complete,through the equity incentive can effectively solve the principal-agent problem,that is why enterprise use this application and recognition widely.As a kind of long-term incentive systems,equity incentive not only can make up for the deficiency of salary system,but also retain talents and attract them better.At the beginning of the 21 th century,China began to split share structure reform,and introduced the equity incentive law,so some companies began to take equity incentive,but many of them failed in the comprehensive deepening reform.Under comprehensive environments and supply-side structural reform,market plays key role in economic development.Equity incentive has been adopted by more and more enterprises as a way of corporate governance.However,short development process of equity incentive in China and the effectiveness of the implementation of equity incentive are affected by many factors,such as the macro market environment,the legal system;the level of corporate governance,personnel structure;micro-equity incentive program design.How to design their own equity incentive plan for the listed companies,how to make the equity incentive program is effective in our urgent need to solve the problem.In this paper,we choose the equity incentive of Shanghai Jahwa as a case,compare the similarities and differences of the three equity incentive schemes,evaluate the effect of equity incentive based on market,finance and competitiveness.It is found that the problem of the design of the equity incentive of Shanghai Jahwa is mainly that the conditions of exercise are unscientific,the incentive efforts vary greatly.In the state-owned enterprises during the period of equity incentive targets are mostly executives,the exercise conditions set low,after the release of executive income is huge,more based on "welfare" motivation,after the implementation of the stock price does not increase.Visible,investors do not agree with the equity incentive.After the reform of the Shanghai Jahwa launched equity incentive,whether in terms of the right conditions or incentive objects are more scientific,especially after the second equity incentive company performance and stock prices have increased significantly,there is a clear incentive,the third equity incentive.The price of the right to close the market price of the design,after unlocking a wide range of coverage,but the per capita cost of income is low,staff enthusiasm is not high,the first phase of the failure to unlock,the more is based on the purpose of stabilizing talent.Therefore,through the Jahwa case can be drawn: equity incentive program design should be based on the actual situation of the enterprise,the company must have a good and stable governance environment,exercise conditions are scientific and reasonable,the incentives is appropriate.Although the selected case analyzed in this paper,the conclusions can provide some reference for listed companies to put the stock group incentives implementation into effect in the future.