The Mechanism Design Of Worker’s Salary Under On-the-job Training

The improvement of labor force quality results from the former scientific education as well as the on-the-job training which is provided by the enterprise.And the on-the-job training is especially important in the formation of human capital.In order to attract job seekers,an increasing number of enterprises provide a comprehensive training system for employees.Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study salary incentive mechanism design of on-the-job training.At first,this thesis studies the problem of salary incentive mechanism design that does not include the enterprise’s expenditure which is used for employee’s on-the-job training,and gives the specific salary contract under the situations of full information、 the worker’s training and working effort which can not be observed、worker’s human capital level which can not be observed as well as the worker’s training and working effort.Besides,this thesis explores the problem of salary incentive mechanism design which includes the cost of enterprise’s onthe-job training.To solve this problem,optimal control principle are used to get the optimal salary contract under the situation in which worker’s human capital level,the worker’s training and working effort can not be observed.Furthermore,when a critical point of the level of human capital exists,the enterprise only hires the employees whose human capital level surpasses the critical point.Under such a situation,the difference of worker’s human capital is increasingly obvious.And the corresponding policy suggestions are given.Finally,in the perspective of search and match theory,this thesis applies dynamic programming and Nash bargaining to study the problem of salary design considering both on-the-job search and on-the-job training.