Research On The Impact Of Executive Compensation And Earnings Management On Accounting Soundness Companies

With the development of the capitalist economy,the modern enterprise system is gradually established,and the separation of ownership and management rights leads to the principal-agent relationship.Based on the theory of information asymmetry,executives have the motivation to carry out earnings management for higher salaries,which leads to the moral hazard and adverse selection of agents,which seriously affect the decision-making of information users and the optimal allocation of social resources.In order to reduce the moral hazard and self-interest behavior of the agent,the client introduces the accounting conservatism in the aspect of enterprise accounting and salary development.As an effective mechanism of corporate governance,accounting conservatism can effectively alleviate the problem of information asymmetry,and can provide evidence for effective supervision of the board of directors,which plays an important role in reducing the agency cost of the enterprise.In particular,after 2006,China has issued new corporate accounting standards,accounting is facing a new change,accounting conservatism and executive compensation issues have been pushed on the cusp.Under the Institutional and economic background of this system,it is helpful to study the impact of the salary and earnings management on the conservatism of the listed companies in China,which will help to develop the Salary incentive way comprehensively and diversified,to promote a salary contract which can not only continue to maintain sound accounting information,but also can maximize the incentive of executive salary.At the same time,it can also reduce the entrusted cost of the professional managers of the company,maintain the operation of the economic market,and supervise the earnings management behavior of the senior executives.This thesis focuses on the combination of empirical research and theoretical research,and focuses on the combination of innovation research and normative research,and discusses the impact of the relationship between executive compensation,earnings management and accounting conservatism of listed companies.In the part of theoretical research,this thesis focuses on the theoretical basic knowledge,summarizes the research results of predecessors,and uses the relevant knowledge and methods such as principal-agent theory,contract theory,information asymmetry theory and human capital theory,the relationship between earnings management and executive compensation to begin theoretical qualitative analysis.In the part of empirical research,this paper chooses the financial data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2016 as the research object.Based on the previous theoretical results and models,the statistical results of the model are analyzed by the SPSS statistical software,and the empirical results are obtained by comparing the economic conditions with the background of China's national conditions and institutional background.Through the analysis of data regression,The author finds that the higher the remeration of listed companies,the higher the margin of earnings management;the greater the earnings management of the listed companies,the worse the company's accounting conservatism;the executive compensation of listed companies and the accounting firm Sexual level was negatively correlated.