Research On The Third Party Logistics Contract Incentives When Considering Supervision

The logistics service outsourcing is one of the ways for enterprises to focus on core competitiveness,with the rapid development of the third party logistics,companies oriented to reduce logistics costs and improve market reaction speed are more likely tend to choose the logistics service outsourcing,to enhance the efficiency of enterprise logistics.The entrusting party and the third party logistics regulate their respective rights and obligations through the contract.This paper studies the principal-agent relationship under supervision,try to construct a model to select the optimal set of actions,to help clients reduce the revenue loss due to asymmetric information while ensuring the agent effective incentive income.However,this study found that,in the case of asymmetric information,the supervision is not necessarily can reduce the incentive cost,but also in the single task principal agent,the agent income level is positively related to the risk level which is determined by the contract coefficient.At the same time,when the agents have high risk aversion,their own factors will limit that even if the entrusting party is willing to set up a high contract coefficient,the agent is unwilling to take risks and make more efforts.Therefore,in setting up the contract coefficient,the entrusting party should consider the degree of risk aversion of the agent.On the basis of single task principal-agent model,this paper constructs a multi task outsourcing model,the result shows that if there is no correlation between several tasks,conclusion is the superposition of single task principal-agent model,the conclusion is very similar,it also analyzes the influence of the coefficient of correlation between task contract.For a number of tasks with related relationships,agents can not subjectively increase the incentive coefficient of a task.This behavior may lead to a reduction in the overall benefits of the outsourcing business.In addition,this paper also analyzed the effects of risk appetite,supervision difficulty degree and the variance of the observed variables on contract coefficient,contrast in the single task and multi task principal-agent model in the solving process,summarized the characteristics of multi task principal-agent performance.At the end of each chapter,this paper use MATLAB to simulate the change trend of the factors in the model,and expounds the mutual influence between the factors,to provide guidance for the principal-agent relationship management,making the research of this paper has certain theoretical and practical significance.