Multi-win Strategies And Generation Rights Models Based On Principal-agent Theory In Electricity Market

Continuing the market-oriented reforms to optimize allocation of the power systemresources and developing green power to achieve the sustainable development are the twomajor trends in the 21st century world power industry development. In response to thistrend, China has gradually relaxed the control of power industry and actively promoted thepilot project on energy-saving power. After years of market-oriented reforms, China'selectricity supply-demand situation has gradually become stable. In the power generationside of electricity markets, including spot transactions, a variety of financial transactionsof power are formed. Power generation companies not only participate in the auction saleof electric energy, but also sell bulk of electricity through contracts. Many varieties of theelectricity market trade models provide more ways to achieve the organic integration ofmarketing reformation and energy-saving emission reduction. Generation rights trade canuse market mechanisms effectively to increase the market share of large units with highenvironmental efficiency, which will give full play to large units' strengths and advantagesof marginal cost and energy-saving emission reduction, ensure a smooth closed of smallthermal power enterprises, achieve effective regulation of the power structure, form aharmonious multi-win-win situation. So conducting in-depth studies of generation rightstrade not only can enrich the varieties of electricity market and improve the existing theoryof electricity market, but also can meet the dual requirements of market-oriented reformsand energy-saving emission reduction, which has important theoretical and practicalvalues.The research results in optimal allocation of hydro-thermal power,electricity marketdesign, profits of the auction proceeds of cascade plants and existing generation rightstrade are summarized in this dissertation. Too frequent changes of trading partners andhigh requirement of the electricity market maturity in existing generation rights trade areanalyzed. Combining with the feature that the high efficiency and environmentalprotection units alternative to the low efficiency and high energy consumption powergeneration units led by generation rights trade, four kinds of generation exchange modelsas without exchange center,with generation exchange center' s contracts participation, with generation exchange center' s employments participation,multi-task principal-agentmodel and the optimal cascade plants ecosystem diversion model for generation power areproposed. Key parameters in the incentive contract and their impacts on participator's riskallocation shares and effort levels are studied. The contracts designed can encouragegeneration rights agent to complete transferential electricity with low energy consumptionand emissions and improve the allocation of power resources. The main research resultsinclude that:To use abandoned water adequately, generation right models without exchange centerand with its contracts participation under asymmetrical information condition is proposedin terms of generation right characteristics. The incentive contract of participators isdesigned to quantify the risk allocation shares of participators and the optimal profits. Theexisting varieties of the electricity market transactions are enriched through the contract.Based on the mediator involved principal-agent theory, the power trading transactionmodels of trading center participation in employment and contract under the asymmetricinformation are proposed, the parameters in the incentive contract of both sizes areanalyzed. Concluded that no matter the trading center participation in employment orcontract, the profits of trading center,transfer power plant and the expectation profit oftransferee power plant increase with the higher efforts level of trading center. Whentrading center participated in employment, its upper limit of profits is the same as tradingcenter participated in contract, the expectation profits of transfer power plant are not lessthan the expectation profits attained when trading center participated in contract.Multi-task principal-agent model between exchange center and generation right agentis proposed in two aspects: the tasks are inter-independent and inter-substitutable. Thenthe incentive coefficients, threshed incentive coefficient and effort levels are analyzed, andthe profits of generation right agent and exchange center with multi-task incentive andsingle task are compared. The incentive mechanism designed can encourage generationagent to complete the both tasks and distribute efforts more reasonably, and increaseenergy consumption utilization and the profits of both participators. To solve the problemof weakening the effectiveness of incentive, the ideas checking generation right agent withits effort on transferring power periodically and its effort on energy-saving emission reduction casually by exchange center are suggested.Finally, based on the principal-agent auction of cascade plants and the species optimalharvesting strategies in ecology, a cascade plants ecosystem diversion model forgeneration power is built, using water rate for power generation to control quantity basedon species optimal harvesting strategies, and the profits of independent power cascadeplants and of cascade plants ecosystem are compared. The model designed can measurewater regulation contribution of upstream plant, optimize the profits of members incascade plants ecosystem. When taking the sustainable development of water resourcesinto consideration, this model also can improve the efficiency of system resourcesallocation, and make members benefit multilaterally.