Study On The Effect Of Debt Structure On Over-investment From The Perspective Of Property Right

For listed companies,financing,investment and profit distribution are the three basic activities of the enterprise.Among them,the investment is the driving force for enterprises to maintain good and stable functioning,and is a connection between financing and profit distribution.Therefore,the efficiency of investment activity has been a concern of the theory and practice.But now over-investment behavior of Chinese listed companies led to widespread overcapacity.Debt is not just a traditional financing tool,scholars find it also has the function of corporate governance especially in investment behavior.But the debt financing will bring two effects.Firstly,the introduction of such objective and independent debt creditors broke the existing relationship of shareholders and managers,the governance of debt relieve the conflict between shareholders and managers.Because managers under the agency might be contrary to the goal of maximizing shareholder's wealth for the personal benefit of blind expansion of business scale,but the introduction of debt makes managers under pressure and supervision,over-investment can be constrained.Secondly,the debt agency costs have led to a conflict between shareholders and creditors when shareholders and managers have common goals,asset substitution may occur.So the relationship between debt and investment behavior of enterprises is worth exploring,but in the study of this relationship,debt cannot simply be treated as homogenous.In this paper,we study the debt which has different maturity and source structure's influence on over-investment under different ownership background.In this paper,we select Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies' financial data from 2011 to 2015 as samples.Based on principal-agent theory,asymmetric information theory,free cash flow hypothesis and governance effects of debt,mainly from the conflict between shareholders and managers and the conflict between shareholders and creditors to explore debt's effect on over-investment.Based on our special property right system,it further divides samples into SOEs and non-SOEs,then,from the total level of the debt,the debt maturity structure,debt source structure's Perspective to explore whether the debt has played a role in over-investment.The empirical results have three conclusions can be drawn: Firstly,china's listed companies in general have a serious over-investment,the total level of the debt and over-investment have negative correlation.Debt can play a governance role,but this role is only reflected in the non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises have not significantly inhibit;Secondly,short-term debt can effectively inhibit over-investment behavior,this effect is better in the non-state-owned enterprises,but the long-term debt has provided money for investment activities and intensified over-investment;Thirdly,bank loans intensified over-investment of state-owned enterprises,while in non-state enterprises,it cannot lead to over-investment.Different to bank loans,commercial credit is based on mutual familiar transactions among enterprises,so it can played the governance role notonly in the state-owned enterprises but also in non-state-owned enterprises,and this role is better in non-state enterprises.As for the bond issue,whether in whole or sub-samples it failed to inhibit over-investment.