Property Nature、DEBT Financing And Overinvestment

Investment efficiency has been the focus of theorists and practitioners concerned,The efficiency of investment is related to the company’s future development,Effective investment could increase the enterprise value,But in recent years,Blind investment in listed companies,Resulting in a lot of capital precipitation, Causing overcapacity. when enterprises expanded investment scale, they has been inclined to ignore the efficiency of investment. Efficiency of business investment in research, most scholars concluded that Overinvestment phenomenon is common in listed companies. How to curb excessive investment in listed companies and to maximize enterprise value, scholars have sought to explore ways to reduce inefficient investment from Internal or external Corporate Governance Factors. And this article is to explore the impact of debt financing for over-investment.Since MM theory is relaxed its stringent assumptions by Scholars, They began to focus on the relationship between financing decisions and investment decisions, examined the influence of the Financing on investment decisions, Debt financing as an external governance factors, It would have an impact of overinvestment in certain extent. In the studies of the effects of debt financing on excessive investment, the majority of our scholars considered the total level of debt and thought that the debt is homogeneous. while ignoring the different term structure, debt structure from different sources have different characteristics, some researchers took into account the heterogeneity of debt, but also from a single source structure or terms of debt maturity structure of the debt to study. Western companies has clear property rights, while our country has a special property system background, state-owned property is not clear, the state-owned and non-state-owned property rights are existed, it is necessary to study the impact of debt structure on overinvestment from the perspective of the nature of property rights and to find that whether there are differences. Therefore, this article is on the basis of previous studies, selecting China Listed Companies 2010--2014 years of data for the sample, using a combination of theoretical and empirical research methods to study.Firstly, based on Asymmetric information theory, Agency theory, Modern property rights theory, the theory of capital structure, Debt financing governance theory and Combined with our special institutional background, the paper analyses Mechanism of the formation of excessive investment from the theoretical and debt financing differences influence over investment under different ownership background; Then, examines whether there is excessive investment of Chinese listed companies from the practice. And the total level of debt, debt source structure, debt maturity structure of governance role of excessive investment under different ownership nature.The empirical results show that: Overinvestment phenomenon is common in listed companies, Compared to non-state-owned enterprises, over-investment problem is more serious in state-owned enterprises. For state-owned enterprises, The total level of debt and overinvestment is positively related liabilities and did not play the role of governance, and in the non-state-owned enterprises, debt financing has played a certain degree of governance effects. Overall, Business credit can curb excessive investment in the whole samples; From the view of the nature of property rights, With respect to state-owned enterprises, commercial credit has a significant negative effect on overinvestment and better treatment effect. In the state-owned enterprises, bank loans is failed to play the role of governance, but aggravated the over-investment enterprises. In the non-state enterprises, bank loans play a certain role in governance. Overall, short-term liabilities can inhibit excessive investment, and long debt does not play inhibition. Judging from the nature of property rights, in state-owned enterprises, regardless of short debt or long debt to excessive investment does not play a treatment effect, but leads to more serious over-investment. In the non-state-owned enterprises, short debt can inhibit overinvestment, long debt does not inhibit overinvestment.