Empirical Study Of Environment Uncertain,Information Disclosure And Investment Efficiency

Investment decision-making is one of the three major financial decisions.The smaller the deviation between investment behavior and optimum investment is,the higher enterprise intrinsic value is,while maintaining the stability of macroeconomic and promoting the development of capital markets.According to the MM theory,if there is a perfect capital market,the firm will only invest the funds into projects with positive net present value.But the perfect market only exists in the hypothesis,the principal-agent,information asymmetry and other issues will have an impact on investment activitiesof enterprise,which may lead to over-investment and under-investment.The essence of the principal-agent theory lies in the separation of ownership and management rights.Namely,investors have the right to claim residual interests,and the management rights of enterprises are transferred to the management.The conflict of interest mainly includes three aspects:conflict of interests between shareholders and managers,conflict of interests between large shareholders and minority shareholders,and conflict of interests between shareholders and creditors.Information asymmetry includes the adverse selection resulted from ex-ante information asymmetry and the moral hazard caused by ex-post information asymmetry.Investment behavior includes the construction period,when corporations invest capital into project,and the businessperiod,when firms recovery funds gradually.During this period,the changes of policy,society,economy,market and other factors are likely to produce adverse impact on enterprise.So the longer duration of investment projects is,the higher risk corporations bear.Therefore,in the study of corporate investment behavior,the uncertainty of the external environment should be included.The environmental uncertainties can be divided into macroscopic uncertainty and microscopic uncertainty.Based on the microscopic environmental uncertainties,this paper validates the negative impact of environmental uncertainty on the investment behavior of enterprises.And further group testingaccording to equity nature shows thatstate-owned companies are more biased in favor of over-investment relative to the non-state-owned company,when external environment is unstable.Meanwhile,the quality of information disclosure is introduced.The quality of information disclosure,as one of the internal governance conditions,can alleviate the principal-agent problem and improve the degree of information matching among the stakeholders.Thus it can weaken the manager’s opportunistic behavior and inefficient investment.This paper studies the impact of environmental uncertainty(external environment factors)and information disclosure quality(internal governance factors)on corporate investment behavior.Through empirical analysis,it is concluded that:when the information disclosure quality is high,the negative effects of environment on investment efficiency in non-state companies are significantly reduced.In the unstable external environment,the governance effect of information disclosure quality of the state-owned companies is lower than that of the non-state companies.And by group testing according to the information disclosure quality,we make further verification on the hypothesis.