Merger Simulation Of Chinese Online Shopping Indus Try:A UPP Test

In the antitrust process,the focus of M&A case analysis is generally the unilateral effect after M&A.Mergers and acquisitions result in increasing market power of the merging enterprises,which may influence the market order and have anticompetitive effect.There are three main measurement methods:structural analysis,UPP test and M&A simulation method.Structural analysis,based on the definition of the relevant market research,will be subject to the accuracy of the relevant market definition.At the same time,there is some stringent using market share as the basis for market forces to determine the logic of the idea.Simulation M&A method is more stringent in the analysis of unilateral effects,but it requires more on data.During the data collection,the data cannot be fully collected.Although the effect of simulated M&A effect is better,it's not easy to operate.UPP test balances in the ease of operation and preciseness.UPP test parameters required are the main product prices,operating costs and transfer rates,greatly reducing the difficulty of operation,while the unilateral effect as a means of analysis,direct The UPP test using the "price change range" as the parameter to analyze the unilateral effect.When the final UPP test value is greater than zero,the UPP test indicates that the price of the product is less than zero.When the final UPP test value is less than zero,it indicates that the price increase pressure after the merger is less than the pressure of price reduction caused by the efficiency increase.Mergers and acquisitions are more competitive than the price increase caused by the efficiency increase.Mergers and acquisitions,to a certain point,do not have anti-competitive effect.This paper employs the UPP test to analyze the unilateral effect of the M&A simulation on the online shopping industry.The online shopping industry is an early development in the Internet economy.The competition pattern is relatively clear.Alibaba's Tmall and Jingdong Mall occupy 80%of the market share.The online shopping industry is an important area of the Internet economy.Online shopping industry has three major characteristics of the Internet industry:free,cross-border and platform effects.The platform effect contributes great analysis difficulty on structural analysis.The UPP examination uses the independent unilateral effect demonstration analysis.The UPP examination carries on quarterly data collection the price index as well as two platform sales expenses to Alibaba and the Jingdong Mall transaction volume during process.The relationship between the transaction volume and the price index is obtained.The correlation coefficient can be used to derive the conversion rate needed by the UPP test.Combining with the price-cost margin and the value of the efficiency increase,the data are collected and analyzed.Based on Alibaba and Jingdong's prices and the cost of UPP test calculation,we obtained Alibaba and Jingdong Mall merger results.Analysis of UPP test value evaluation shows the anti-competitive effect.UPP test results show that the merger of Alibaba and Jingdong will inevitably lead to price increases,with significant anti-competitive effect.From the perspective of anti-monopoly of online shopping industry,there are still many aspects needing to think about.The paper concludes as follows.Monopolistic behavior is dominant in the industry to maintain their monopoly position.In order to obtain more monopoly profits,the monopolistic behavior of the shortcomings are mainly reflected in the monopoly position of the platform for electricity providers and the upper reaches of the electricity industry,the impact of the industry.The basis of economic efficiency of the merger is the size of the scale and format of competition.The degree of competition is not necessarily linked to the key factor in the degree of competition is to enter the threshold;to eliminate the merger of enterprises means that the relevant departments in a number of specific measures should also make a difference to reduce the platform for electricity providers to enter the industry threshold.The level of competition in the platform is not only related to the market structure of the current platform providers,but also to the ease with which potential competitors can enter the market.Lower entry thresholds favor the entry of potential competitors,which directly imposes Involved in the incumbent competition.