Research On The Sales Effort Of The Seller Of The Supply Chain Repurchase Contract

White hot competition in the market today, the rapid development of information technology, more and more similar products, relying on the price competition, enterprises to gain market advantage, therefore, more and more people began to pay attention to the influence of the sales effort on demand. For some durable consumer goods, such as mobile phone, computer, automobile, consumers to buy or not to buy and the seller has a direct relationship between the sales effort. Vendors through efforts so as to improve the demand, the supplier wishes to sellers pay a maximum effort, because of the information asymmetry, different goals, vendors will only in the cost and profit of their own to maximize the basis to determine the sales effort level, thus leading to the supply chain is not coordinated state.Under asymmetric information, the retailer effort dependent demand situation, how to incentive method prompted vendors try to improve the sales effort, can make the dispersion state of the vendors decision optimal system, realize the coordination of the supply chain, have become an important issue in the research of supply chain contract. For the buy back contract number, commodity is taken to repurchase the return of all, thus reducing the seller's market risk, the market risk and uncertainty is transferred to the supplier. Therefore, as the supply chain agents, for the number of buy back setting, in which can reduce the risk of their own and can incentive the retailer to increase sales, improve their own interests, it is particularly important to the realization of the overall coordination of supply chain system.This paper uses the supply chain coordination theory, motivation theory, contract theory, in the two echelon supply chain buyback contract model as the research object, the supplier is implementation of incentive, is a single life cycle of products, the incentive problem and information asymmetry in the demand influenced by vendors effort level the retailer's effort level. Sales began to stage, first of all vendors to determine the order quantity and prepare their effort level. This article first analyzed under asymmetric information scattered under the control of the supply chain is not up to the system optimal levels, from lower angle of supplier risk presents a minimum number of buy back of the buy back strategy based on supply chain coordination, thereby obtained. Then analysis the feasibility of the proposed contract, contract feasible conditions to be met, so that the supplier and the retailer's profit in coordination have been improved after Pareto. Then, analyzes the influence of the wholesale price and the repurchase price to the system, to demonstrate that supply chain coordination, buy back strategy in the repurchase price and the wholesale price must meet a certain linear relationship. At the end of the cost sensitive coefficient has relationship with the seller's effort level, sensitivity analysis of elastic coefficient, analyzes their influence on supply chain coordination. This paper proposed a minimum quantity of repurchase under asymmetric information based on the supply chain buyback contract coordination and make the benefit obtained among supply chain members are increased, to achieve a win-win situation.