| Tournament as a kind of relative performance evaluation of incentive mechanism,because of its less supervision cost, eliminate external interference and reduce the subjective evaluation of the risk of moral hazard, in compensation management,promotion management, patent development competition and the competition between local governments, and many other fields have a wide range of research and application.But in previous studies, the study of the mechanism is more focused on the analysis of the static environment, that is established in the rules, the agent has a certain level, the efforts of the fixed level. In reality, due to these factors, such as information disclosure, periodic summary leads to agent adjust their behavior according to the competition. Because of its dynamic characteristics of multistage and information sharing, dynamic game can further characterization of real life and get the researchers ‘s attention.It is because of dynamic tournaments of multi-stage features closer to the real life that triggers our research interest for the following questions:First of all, how to deal competitors in different period of different levels of effort with implement the corresponding strategy in real life ?Second, how the unfair phenomena existing in reality competition environment effects the behavior of the competitors?Affirmative action, is to give the object to the extra output compensation, that is to say, the backward to object to the extra "prejudice" or "take care". Affirmative action implementation will surely give the laggards a favorable competitive environment, then take this measure will really help to them? Affirmative action implementation, have a certain competitive pressure for leader, for the laggard is equivalent to more than a layer of "umbrella", whether this will affect their efforts and disrupting levels? Competitors and organizers of earnings volatility will exist?In order to study the above problems, this paper designed the five efforts experiment has carried on the experimental research, focus on the agent effort levels and sabotage in environment of dynamic mechanism of affirmative action strategies.Based on the experimental data of 134 participants analyzed, and get the following research conclusions.First, the unfair will lead to a decline in the overall effort level agent;Second, extreme unfair will lead to a part of the agent to level of ascension;Third, affirmative action will stimulate the part of the agent effort level only;Fourth, in the affirmative action experiments, the implementation of lean strategy did not increase the employee's output, that is to say, did not improve the organization benefits.Finally, from the point of the organization as a whole, and the implementation of preferential policy, will not bring extra income, but it can regulate atmosphere within the organization.In a word, for the enterprise, we should limit the implementation of the affirmative action. Because, even for backward employees implement special "care", does not improve its benefits. On the contrary, the implementation of affirmative action may increase the transaction cost of enterprises. This article research conclusion to macro policy implemented by the government also has a certain reference. On high-income group, for example, high progressive tax, personal income will reduce their working enthusiasm, at the same time encourage low-income groups inertia, resulting in the country's total tax reductions. From this perspective, the implementation of the preferential policies conducive to improve the level of the efforts of the staff, is not conducive to improve the country's overall welfare level, even the government will also increase on the implementation of these policies and management costs. Therefore, the government should review the overall impact of implement preferential policy on social welfare.So unfair factors and affirmative action affect the behavior of the agent for organization provides theoretical reference for the decision-making managers. |
PDF Full Text Request