The Research On Co-opetition Coordination And Income Distribution Mechanism Of The Supply Chain In The Composition Of Coal And Electric Power Enterprises In Guizhou

At the present stage Chinese on-grid price and the price of terminal client under the condition that electricity price regulated strictly by government,the profit space of electric power enterprise is limited. If the way by improving the terminal customer price to make coal price’s rising pressure all passed on to consumers is impossible, the electric power enterprise need through which way to digest the cost pressure, and even the survival pressure, this is an important issue.There is no doubt that changes in the price of coal is an important influencing factors that the bidding for electric network whether can effectively carry out.In this paper, an altruistic factor was introduced to the electric power enterprise, to return for lower thermal coal wholesale price.Then this paper studies the different gains of the supply chain members in different altruistic coefficients. It is concluded that under the certain market coal price pool is better than not joint management pattern. It distributes the income of coal supply chain members that joint the management reasonablly though the revenue sharing contract.In different changes of the coal price range, this paper introduces the Stackelberg model to found in the feed-in tariff threshold points of the three types:joint management, strategic alliance and the integration,analyzes the different forms of alliance internal consumption rate of changing prices. Comparing the critical points of power grid companies began to give subsidies and subsidies coefficient in three different cases, to suggest that in different stages of thermal coal prices, the government can encourage the optimum alliance corresponding it’s stage(standard for the optimal alliance at this point is the power grid companies not subsidies or it’s subsidies coefficient is relatively minimal).After power grid companies determining coefficient of subsidies at different stages, it analyses the corresponding within each phase between coal enterprises should take which kind of the optimal joint, to realize the maximization of the interests of both upstream and downstream enterprises under certain conditions.Finally, this paper puts forward the relevant policy recommendations according to the conclusions for guizhou coal, electricity enterprises, power grid company and the government related department.Meanwhile, thefurther directions of its research and key points are presented.