| CFO plays an important role in the financial decision of the listing Corporation, so how to make appropriate CFO incentive policies, how to control firm's risk-taking level by using CFO's professional knowledge and how to make full use of debt financing's leverage effect, has become the theorists and practitioners need to solve.Sampled by the Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2015, this paper research on how the incentives of CFO influence the firm's risk taking and debt financing. The intermediary role of risk taking was tested by the method of intermediate test. The descriptive statistics, grouping analysis and multiple regression analysis were used. Finally, the results show that CFO's incentive by salary increases firm's risk taking and debt financing. Under the intermediary role of risk, CFO's incentives by salary and debt financing is positively related; on the contrary, CFO's incentive by ownership decreases firm's risk-taking and debt financing. Under the intermediary role of risk, CFO's incentives by ownership and debt financing is negatively related; And the impact of CFO's incentive on risk taking and debt financing will be weakened due to CEO's financial background.The contribution of this paper lies in:(1)This paper is different from the most literature which research in executive compensation incentive or ownership incentive impact on the enterprise risk alone, the concentration on the CFO is not only the supplement of CEO's incentive behavior by salary and risk taking behavior, to further consider the professionals as CFO, their incentive policies influence corporate risk taking behavior and debt financing;(2)this paper has studied that CEO who have a financial background have an inhibitory effect in CFO incentive, risk taking and debt financing behavior. The related results have certain practical significance for the formulation of CFO incentive policies, the control of proper risk taking level and the optimization of debt financing in listing Corporation in China. |
PDF Full Text Request