Research On The Improvement Of Intellectual Capital Disclosure Of GWI Corporation

Intellectual capital has tow paths to create value, it not only creates excess profits for enterprise directly, but also enhances the value of enterprise through the way of information disclosure indirectly. GWI contains rich intellectual capitals, however, it paid less attention to the disclosure of intellectual capital information, and the level of disclosing intellectual capital information is below the average level of electronic information technology industry. As a result, the information asymmetry between the company and outside investors has increased, which leads investors to underestimate or miscalculate of the company's future value and leads the company to face the poor performance in the stock market and the weak position in the competition of market resources. Therefore, the management of GWI needs to improve the information disclosure of intellectual capital for the reason of transferring more "high quality" signal, reducing the pressure of legitimacy, and obtaining more information rent.Based on the six theory of stakeholder, legality, signal transmission, information rent, proprietary cost and impression management, by using the methods of documentary research, case study, comparative analysis, questionnaire survey and content analysis, with the electronic information technology industry and ZTE as control group,taking the preference of users for intellectual capital information as a starting point, the paper builds the three-level index system and measurement standard of evaluating the intellectual capital information disclosure level and gives a comparative analysis of the basic situation, behavior and level of intellectual capital disclosure of GWI. The paper finds that there are several problems about the intellectual capital disclosure of GWI, including lack of voluntary reporting channels,the quality of disclosure content below the average level of the industry, the exit of selective disclosing behavior of different types of intellectual capital information and undesirable economic consequences of disclosing. Then, the paper finds that GWI has weaker awareness of disclosing intellectual capital information voluntarily, less impression management means of information disclosure, blind risk avoidance attitude toward the risk of full disclosure, and poor supply of intellectual capital information. Finally, the paper gives some advice that GWI should build more voluntary channels of disclosing intellectual capital, strengthen the quality control of the content of intellectual capital information, construct the scientific decision support system of intellectual capital information disclosure, and establish the tracking and feedback mechanism of intellectual capital information disclosure.