The Study Of Controlling Shareholders?executives Implicit Compensation On Enterprise Value

With the media's attention to the listed company,executive pay especially executives implicit compensation causes more and more people's attention.In China,enterprises especially stated-owned enterprises exist recessive executives implicit compensation.Too much implicit compensation can lead to corruption to a certain extent.The ownership structure of listed companies becomes more and more centralized.When the ownership structure becomes centralized,the controlling shareholders will encroach on the interests of minority shareholders by the way of tunnels behavior,related party transaction,which is not conducive to the improvement of enterprise value.Therefore,this article will study the influence of the controlling shareholders,executives implicit compensation on the enterprise values,which has important practical significance.This paper selects three years(2012-2014)sample data of 437 state-owned enterprises and 210 private enterprises in Shanghai stock exchange.The paper is based on the theory of principal-agent and contain gains and uses the SPSS20.0 software to study the influence of controlling shareholders,executives' implicit compensation on enterprise values.The empirical results show that: in state-owned and private enterprises,the relationship between the control and the enterprise value is significantly negative;The cash-flow right and enterprise value are positively related in state-owned and private enterprises;Two rights separation degree is negatively related to the enterprise value,but two rights separation of private enterprises is much higher than that of state-owned enterprises,which makes the enterprise value is much lower in private enterprises;In state-owned and private enterprises,the executive implicit compensation and the enterprise value are negatively related and the executive implicit compensation in state-owned enterprises is much more than that in private enterprises;In state-owned enterprises,the executive implicit compensation under the local government control is much more than that under the control government control,which makes the enterprise value is much lower in the enterprises under the local government control;In state-owned enterprises,the negative connection between the control and executive implicit compensation is much weaker than that in private enterprises;In state-ownedenterprises,the negative connection between the cash-flow right and executive implicit compensation is much weaker than that in private enterprises;In state-owned and private enterprises,the two rights separation is positively related to the executive implicit compensation.In a word,the appropriate relationship about them can make conducive to the improvement of corporate performance.This research expects to provide practical reference to improve the enterprise value for state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.