Study Of Online Auction Mechanism For Time-sensitive Products

Mechanism design is designing mechanism which can lead to a socially desirable outcomes in a context within which everyone is self-interested,but traditional one is focused on static environment where type of participants are known to the mechanism before any determination being made,and the decision is made only once include matching and payment rules for every agent.However,many real market are dynamic,for example,stock exchange,where participants are arriving and departing at different times,the mechanism need to make decisions without information about agents in future and market,so the existing optimal solutions for static environment are inappropriate.Over the past decade,study about mechanism design for dynamic economic environment has gained the attentions of many researchers,but mostly are payed close attention to one-sided dynamic market models,yet,in a many-to-many double market,the online mechanism is required to improve the profit.This paper,we design an online auction mechanism for double market where traders are dynamic and trade the time sensitive commodity,due to the timeliness the value of commodity will declined over time,so the sellers have to suffer loss when they failed to sell the commodity within the specific duration,so a online auction mechanism which based on the assume of no loss is also not appropriate.In order to improve the transaction success rate,we present and implement suitable online double auction mechanism to solve the resource allocation problem under dynamic market environment.The main work and innovation of this paper include:1)Design suitable online auction mechanism for time sensitive commodity under double dynamic market,for the purse of improving matching success rate,we carry on a theoretical analysis on incentive compatible from the perspective of the two sides and then establish the simulation experiment to prove that our mechanism is superior in improving transaction rate and realizing fair price-making between agents than traditional equilibrium matching.2)Consider the problem of combination auction in double dynamic market,design an online auction mechanism under the condition of buyers demand cannot be part and then establish the simulation experiment to simulate the behavior of agents in order to prove the validity of the mechanism.3)The innovation include: 1.valuation is not the only driver when designing the matching rule,but combine valuation with time factor to design the Time-based matching algorithm,the idea is to set priority for every agent and then improve the success rate by taking precedence for the agent who has the low value,and then design the mating payment rule to guarantee the incentive compatible and fair-pricing at the same time.2.When consider the combination auction for time sensitive commodity in double market,ameliorate the Time-based algorithm by add the trading volume to type of agents in order to meet the demand of combination market and then establish the simulation experiment to validate the mechanism.