| In recent years,administrative organs and citizens has paid great high attention to the issue of agricultural non-point pollution,both agricultural law,environment-protection law enacted by organs of state power and some other regulations and policies enacted by administration stipulates clearly pay attention to agricultural non-point pollution,especially pointed out that reducing agricultural chemicals application rate such as fertilizers and pesticides,hereby,to protect agricultural sustainable development.As the nation’s leader agricultural province,Heilongjiang plays an important role in our nation’s agricultural economic development,it is significant for China’s agricultural development that protect agricultural ecological environment and promote agricultural sustainable development of Heilongjiang province.Fertilizer non-point source pollution of Heilongjiang province affected by natural factors with the characteristics of complex,dispersion,concealment,hysteresis and randomness,and at present,lack for fertilizer non-point source pollution control measures and some relative policies.During agricultural non-point pollution control,the phenomenon of market lost control and government failure can appear on account of each in organization which constituted by government,farmers and fertilizer dealers is a rational economic body,based on this background,constructs a behavior choice of non-point source pollution control game model with government,farmers and fertilizer dealers involve in,furthermore,to find a suitable fertilizer of non-point source pollution control countermeasures in Heilongjiang province,the research to sustainable development of agriculture in Heilongjiang province has an important theoretical guiding significance.Based on the stakeholder theory,analyze government,farmers and fertilizer dealers three main behavior relationship in fertilizer non-point source pollution control and provides basic hypothesis for the follow-up studies.Respectively according to game theory to build the three main body between two complete information static game model,the three sides to participate in the complete information static game model and the three parties involved in the incomplete information dynamic game model,using the theory of Nash equilibrium to solve the game model of equilibrium strategies set,delving into the three main body behavioral selection in the chemical fertilizer non-point source pollution control system.Through the analysis found that,during chemical fertilizer of non-point source pollution control in Heilongjiang province,behavioral selection relationship between government,farmers and fertilizer dealers influence each other closely,and playing the government power fullest effect can achieve the goal of fertilizer non-point source pollution control,and according to current policy puts forward some appropriate countermeasures. |