Evolution Of Cooperation Through Adaptive Interaction In Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game

In this paper,we study the effect of adaptive interaction on the evolution of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Developing theoretical model,simulation of Monte Carlo method and the experiment carry out by the volunteers we recruit are used to study it.The connections of players are co-evolutionary with cooperation;whether adjacent players can play the prisoner's dilemma game is associated with the strategies they took in the preceding round.If a player defected in the preceding round,his neighbors will refuse to play the prisoner's dilemma game with him in accordance with a certain probability distribution.We use disconnecting strength ? to represent this probability.We discuss the evolution of cooperation with different values of temptation to defect T,sucker's payoff S and disconnecting strength ?.The simulation results show that cooperation can be significantly enhanced through increasing the value of disconnecting strength.In addition,the increase in disconnecting strength can improve the cooperators' ability to resist the increase in temptation and the decrease in reward.Cooperation is promoted because the enhancement in ? decreases the number of times that cooperators and defectors encounter each other,so it reduces the general extent to which the cooperators are exploited.We study the parameter ranges for three different evolutionary results: cooperators extinction,defectors extinction,cooperator and defector co-existence.Meanwhile,we recruited volunteers and designed a human behavioral experiment to verify the theoretical simulation results.We recruited a total of 288 volunteers.They played games with the on-line system developed by myself.After two months,1440 sets of data were collected.The punishment of disconnection has a positive effect on cooperation according to the data.A higher disconnecting strength will enhance cooperation more significantly.Our research findings reveal some significant insights into efficient mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation.