| Horizontal mergers has long been one of the most important ways for modern enterprises to grow, it remains to be the concerning point of researchers and anti-trust authorities since its potential influences of consumer and social welfare through unilateral effects and moderating effect. A wave of merger which were mainly of horizontal merger has been occurred in China with the reform deepening, industrial structure adjustment and state-owned enterprises reforming since 1990s. Since the central government decided to develop the mix-owned economies in the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, it is predictably that mix-owned economies would become an important part of our country, and the research on horizontal merger of mix-owned enterprises would also become an important part of "New Normal". On such a background, the thesis built models of horizontal merger of mix-owned oligopolies based on Cournot and Stackelberg model, and introduced the concept of synergy, which studied the welfare effects and efficiency effects from both static and dynamic perspectives, and then discussed the anti-monopoly control of such mergers.The thesis followed the analysis structure of "theoretical framework-simulation analysis-policy proposal". The whole research contains four parts, the first part is introduction, which introduced the background of the research, meaning of research, literature review, framework, Innovations and shortcomings. The literature review intensively introduced the horizontal mergers and mixed-oligopoly models. The second part built the model of static horizontal merger of mix-owned oligopolies based on Cournot model, and I researched the influences of market structure and property right structure to merger welfare, the research showed that even if there is a synergistic effect that can reduce the cost of production, the merger under mixed ownership would still lead to a decline in consumer welfare. The social welfare change with mixed ownership in the proportion of the private property right presents inverted U-type features. The third part built the model of dynamic horizontal merger of mix-owned oligopolies based on Stackelberg model, and the equilibrium results show that merger between leader companies would improve the social welfare in some occasions compared with merger between following companies, however the consumer surplus will be reduced in both situations. The last part discussed the thumb rules of anti-monopoly in censoring such mergers based on the research of part two and three, then draw the conclusions of the whole research, and pointed out that the influence of property rights should be considered, thus form a comparative consolidated standard of anti-monopoly which suits different property rights enterprises. |
