Interest Conflict Game Analysis Of The Institutional Imitation In Less Developed Regions

With the social progress and economic development, the developments of less developed regions get more and more attention. The reason for the poor in less developed regions, in addition to historical factors, the institutional shortage is also an important reason, while the institutional imitation is an important way to make up for the institutional shortage. However, in order to pursue the self-interest maximization, it tends to have interest conflict among the interest subjects. Game analysis will provide theoretical reference for the institutional imitation, and will also provide feasible suggestions to solve the problem of institutional shortage in less developed regions.After definition of relevant concepts and review of relevant theories, this paper carried out theoretical analysis from three aspects. One is compared the institutional imitation between less developed regions and developed regions. The second is to extract the direct interest subjects of institutional imitation according to the administrative hierarchy: the public, the vested interests groups, the local government and the central government. The third is to explain the relationship of interest conflict among subjects, which brought the possibility to build the relevant game model.First, this paper launches a complete information static game analysis firstly in the game of interest conflict between the public and the vested interests groups. It points out that the two sides’ attitude towards institutional imitation depends on the costs and benefits of each. However, each game player groups will gradually adjust its strategy with the knowledge learning and imitation. Because the two sides are both on behalf of the interests of different groups, it is appropriate to use the replication dynamic mechanism to simulate the learning and strategy adjustment in the long term, and then using the evolutionary game shows that, contrary to the public, the vested interests groups will oppose the institutional imitation in the long run.Second, the public attitude towards institutional imitation depends on the ultimate benefit. This article assumes that the public has the basic negotiation skill, and discusses the two sides’ relationship of interest conflict by using the bargaining game. It indicates that public support can narrow the scope of interest conflict from the source.Third, there is also the risk of collapse in an alliance of vested interest groups and local government. In most cases, the interest conflict between the two sides is repeated. And the repeated game can achieve better benefit which one-time game can’t get, as a starting point, by using the "rotation strategy" and "trigger strategy", the results show that the game has really improved efficiency with the increase of the number of game. This reminds the local government ought to cooperate with the vested interests groups as far as possible, and thus alleviate the degree of interest conflict; the local government should also attach great importance to the use of repeated game ideas, and thus improve the efficiency of the institutional imitation in the long term.Fourth, the central government’s funding policy affects the institutional imitation as well. It found that cost and benefit will determine the final balance through the complete information game analysis between the central government and local government. Taking into account that the institutional imitation can be seen as pairwise random matching game between representatives of the central government and representatives of the local government, this paper build the evolutionary game payoff matrix between the central government and the local government. Results show that the evolutionary stable strategy of the game is(funding, imitation) or(no funding, no imitation).In order to benefit from the institutional imitation, the local government should account the cost and benefit in advance and adjust the allocation ratio of benefit timely with the central government.Finally, on the basis of game analysis, this paper presents several corresponding suggestions: it will narrow the scope of the interest conflict if the officials could be harmony with the public; it will reduce the degree of interest conflict if the local government could cooperate with the vested interests groups; it is able to avoid information asymmetry between subjects if there is a sound mechanism. Besides, it is also proposed further research from the aspects of research perspectives in this paper.