The Effect Of Subsidies On Internal Click Farming In Network Take-out

In today’s society, the Internet technology bring new business model for the traditional industry, providing new opportunities for development.With the rapid development of Internet technology and its application, Internet and traditional industries convergence has reduced transaction costs and has increased economic efficiency.The emergence of the "Internet+" industry is the inevitable big trend, and the birth of the network take-out, network taxi, network fresh bilateral market is the confirmation.These markets has both bilateral cross network external of the market, but also the feature of high frequency that traditional industry itself has such as take-out, taxi market and fresh market, so the future development potential is tremendous.The new rise of bilateral market generally includes three parties involved in the subject:platform enterprises, consumers and businesses. Platform enterprises among them as an intermediary agency between general consumers and businesses agencies,which determines the way of competition in the price between them. At the same time, the nature of the bilateral market also determines the pricing way of the platform enterprises adopting subsidies to attract a large number of user groups to use the platform, and change their consumption habits, then formed a certain user consumption viscosity and took market shares finally. Platform enterprise price subsidies has two sides. On the one hand, it can make the platforms get promotion and market grow rapidly. On the other hand, it can make them fall in subsidies competition easily, bringing low efficiency to the industry. The phenomenon of internal click farming appeared when companies of platform compete on using price subsidies. This is a kind of act of unfair competition, distorting the real needs of the market and disturbing the market economic order. Figuring out what is the relationship between the internal click farming and take-out platform enterprise subsidies plays an important role in the accessing of a healthy development road. In this paper, I see the network take-out market as the research object, explore the subsidies, merchants internal click farming and the effects of subsidies to internal click farming and put forward feasible suggestions for the network take-out platform enterprises.At present, the domestic and foreign scholars on the study of bilateral market mainly focused on bilateral market features, classification and platform of enterprise way of pricing and competition, etc., but moral risk research is relatively few between platform enterprises and platform users. In this paper, according to the theory of bilateral market, merchants internal click farming as the reality orientation, internet take-away market as the research object, first I analysis the subsidies in the take-out market and the competition among the platform enterprises from the perspective of two-sided market, and then analysis internal click farming phenomenon from the subsidies of the bilateral market platform enterprise, which is based on case studies and the game theory, standardized research and empirical research method of combining the subsidies and internal click farming these two kinds of phenomena of industrial organization and subsidies to the influence of the internal click farming are studied systematically.The core research contents of this paper is the effects of subsidies and merchants internal network take-out platform enterprises, the subsidy and the internal click farming in the internet take-out market is also discussed in this paper in order to explain this article content preferably, finally makes every effort to provide theoretical support for the healthy development of the network take-out market.In this paper, I discusses the research background and significance first, and put forward the research question, summarized at home and abroad on bilateral market characteristics and competition between research platform. Bases on this, the framework of this paper is put forward. Secondly, I expound the mechanism of running network take-out market, including network formation mechanism and operation mechanism of the take-away market. The factors of the formation of the network outside take-out market include the Internet impact, eat-in encounter "bottleneck" and "lazy" economic opportunities. Again, study in-depth subsidies in network take-out market, use "time of attrition" game model analysis platform subsidies in the enterprise competition, come to the conclusion that subsidies will last forever. Then, I in-depth analysis the internal click farming and conditions for the existence of a single phenomenon.Then, I build "supervision game tree" model for internal click farming to explain the phenomena; Analyzing the impact of subsidies, founding the intensity of subsidies and the form of subsidies for internal click farming phenomenon has big influence. And according to the model I proposed other factors influenced the internal click farming and put forward some suggestions for the internet take-out platform enterprises to prevent enterprise internal click farming. Finally I put forward the summary and outlook of the full text.In this paper, the main conclusions are as follows:first, the network delivery platform for enterprises to fight for market share will use the pricing way of subsidy, and will continue; Second, the more internal click farming phenomenons happened when businesses use the more costs of the good faith management and obtain the reputation of the pay less. Subsidies is one of the important factors affecting the internal click farming phenomenon, and the intensity and form of subsidies all can affect the incidence of the internal click farming, in the case of a merchant direct subsidy, the more subsidies, the greater the chances of internal click farming.Third, though the introduction of network delivery market factors, I found that platform of enterprise supervision mechanism, the types of businesses and market segment can affect the internal click farming in addition to subsidy. Fourth, network take-out platform enterprise can through self-built logistics team, optimize the structure of subsidies, perfecting the supervision mechanism and increase quality merchants to prevent internal click farming phenomenon.