Study The Behavior Choice Of The Electric Power Enterprise And Carbon Tax Rate、Return Efficiency Based On Game Theory

In recent years, as the global climate continues to deteriorate, the greenhouse effect has attracted people’s attention. Carbon dioxide is the main gas that causes the greenhouse effect, therefore, numerous studies have been focused on the solutions to reduce the carbon dioxide emission. Carbon tax is an important economic measures to control and reduce carbon dioxide emissions, Some developed countries have taken lead role in the implementation of carbon tax policy, and have achieved good results. Under this global economic environment, carbon tax is a trend in China for energy saving and carbon emission reduction, as well as optimizing domestic industrial structures.Electric power industry is an essential basic industry in supporting national economic development,. However, it is also characterized as high energy consumption and high pollution, and is the main industry responsible for China’s carbon dioxide emissions,.Therefore, electric power industry is one of the primary objectives for implementing carbon dioxide emission reduction policy in China.In this thesis, we proposed an optimized carbon tax rate and return efficiency for the government based on assessing the factors of economic benefits, social benefits and environmental benefits, and the social welfare maximization. First of all, assuming carbon tax was imposed by government, the behavior choice of the electric power enterprise can be classified into three categories: acceptance with no subsidy, acceptance with subsidies, and emission reduction with no subsidy. According to the duopoly game model between conventional power companies and new energy companies, the government tended to give direct subsidies to new energy companies in short term when applied a carbon tax; whereas the government was more willing to support conventional power companies with reduce carbon emissions, and encouraging the development of new energy companies in long term. Secondly, by constructing the carbon tax return model, the optimized government carbon tax rate and the level of subsidy were obtained with a given reduce emission objective. The results showed that a reasonable carbon tax rate and subsidy could help to optimize the structure of electric power industry, promote the development of low-carbon enterprises, and reduce the total carbon dioxide emissions in China’s power industry.