Study Of Cooperative Models And Profits Allocation In Logistics Service Supply Chain Based On Supply Chain Service Platform

The current situation of Logistics and Supply Chain industry in China is fragmented, leading to a lot of problems, like the duplication of logistics information system functions, data is not standardized and can not be interconnected, and supply and demand information is asymmetric. The lack of inovative business models and service platforms using advisory services to integrate the supply and demand is another problem. At the same time, in order to maximize their own profits, members of the chain are always constantly looking for new business models and partners. In the different structures of the supply chain, which one should the members in different positions choose to cooperate with? Which cooperative model is the most stable one? Whether it can increase profits after cooperation? How to allocate the increase profits? Therefore, this paper will focus on the platform, collaboration, distribution of profits, the three research focuses, through the study of logistics service supply chain based on supply chain service platform, to explore the most suitable cooperative mode and profit allocation mechanism.To begin with, the basic conceptions and relative theories are introduced. Then, research importance is pointed out. Previous literatures divided into four parts, logistics service platform(supply chain service platform), logistics service supply chain, cooperation in supply chain and profit allocationare are summarized. All of above establish theory foundation for follow-up research.This article mainly studies three problems. Chapter 3 investigates a logistics service supply chain system which involves in a single functional logistics service provider, two logistics service integrators and a supply chain service platform. Unit information fee is is paid to the platform by the functional logistics service provider. In this way, there are four kinds of cooperative models. After that, the optimal service level, the optimal wholesale price and sales price of service, the maximum demand and total profits are obtained by game theory. It is found that the total supply chain profits of three cooperative models are not less than that of the decentralized system. Whatever the cooperation pattern is, the optimal logistics service level stays the same. Furthermore, numerical examples show that if the unit is more and more expensive, the sales price and wholesale price of services will rise, but the market demand and the supply chain profits will shrink. If logistics service providers are more sensitive to logistics costs, all the results will decrease. The study also found that service providers perfer to improve the service level in return for lower unit information fee in order to obtain higher profits. Especially in supply chain involving in the service platform, due to the unit information fee shall be formulated by the platform, only through improving the service level can participants get higher profits. Moreover, service level is decided by the logistics service provider, so that other members in order to obtain higher profits will urge service providers to provide higher quality of services. Therefore, the intervention of the platform can make the whole supply chain pursuit a higher level of logistics service on its own initiative.Chapter 4 considers a logistics service supply chain system which involves in a single logistics service integrator, two functional logistics service providers and a supply chain service platform. In this way, there are four kinds of cooperative models which influence the overall supply chain profits. Research shows that after the cooperation, total profits are more than that of the decentralized system. The sale price of centralized system is even lower than the wholesale price of the decentralized system, the total market demand is three times than that of the decentralized system and the optimal service level remains the same. The advantage of cooperation is fully reflected. At the same time, the optimal logistics service level is double that of the previous chapter. The structure of supply chain might affect the optimal services level and an increase in the number of service providers may lead to the improvement of the services they provide. The study also found that when the supply chain service platform makes rules of the unit information fee, high charge is a blow to the whole market and the game participants. Reasonable scope of charge can help the whole market to have a long-term, steady and healthy development.How to maintain the long-term and steady supply chain cooperation relationship? Chapter 5 studies this problem, using the cooperative game theory to find out a fair, reasonable profit allocation mechanism. First of all, the related key concepts of the cooperative game theory are introduced. Then, according to two different types of supply chain structure, in the case that all the incomes are the function expression, the three sides’ Shapley value are calculated. Finally, using numerical examples show the results before and after cooperation and allocation. In practice, in order to ensure the long-term and stable relations of cooperation, the participants should use the Shapley value to determine the profit allocation proportion, according to their respective contribution in all kinds of alliance to sign a reasonable agreement.A brief summary and future research are given in the end. As a whole, this study enriches the logistics service supply chain management theory, and provides some useful and targeted countermeasures for logistics service supply chain enterprises on economic management problems such as who to cooperate with, how to allocate profits, and points out some meaningful innovation strategy and valuable theoretical reference for the rule makers of platform.