Mining Land Exit Route Optimization Based On The Dynamic Game Theory

With the quick economic development and accelerating urbanization, the city scale is expanding rapidly that the construction land demand is booming. Nevertheless, there is more population and less land in China which lead to the outstanding contradiction between land supply and demand. Moreover, extensive inefficient utilization of mining land is one of the key factors that contribute to a series of land use contradictions, and a practical problem that influences the continuous stable operation of the economic society. According to the mining life cycle theory, mining operation would encounter resource exhaustion and mine closure in the later stage, and leave a large amount of deserted land in the mining area. Therefore, we should take into consideration how to effectively choose the best exit route for the idle or ineffectively used land with good location and potential value to ease the population expansion and lack of land.Firstly, this thesis analyzes the possible stakeholders in the process of mining land exit and defines the stakeholders on the basis of stakeholder theory. Based on the theory of land property rights and land value increment, this thesis probes into the key stakeholders’ interest demands, and clearly identifies the reasons to the interest conflicts among the stakeholders.Secondly, based on the analysis above, and sustainable development theory, taking the neoclassical economics and the new institutional economics as the cutting point, this thesis defines mining land exit as mining land reserve and mining land reclamation. According to the investigation and analysis on related cases, it also provides corresponding suggestions to the benefit distribution methods during the mining land reserve and mining land reclamation.Thirdly, combined with the current mining land exit practice, this thesis provides solutions with different dynamic game models according to the original land users’ characteristics of different mining land exit Routes and the key stakeholders’ appeals. As to the mining land reserve, it adopts Rubinstein’s bargain model to figure out the distribution ratio of the key stakeholders’ interest. As to the mining land reclamation, it introduces the complete information dynamic game model. When solving the model, it puts forwards different propositions and gives out different deductions. According to the analysis above, it provides three land reclamation methods in equilibrium: deep excavation, modified utilization, land development.In the end, it conducts empirical analysis on the development of stock land and switch to other products in the Gu shuyuan mining of Jin Cheng Anthracite Mining Group. By analyzing the inner and outer resources and the adaptation of different mining land exit Routes, it put forwards the assumed suggestion of Gu shuyuan mining land exit. By analyzing the dynamic model, it provides the best exit Routes for Gu shuyuan mining.