Strategy Research Of Effective Supervision On Third-party Payment Based On Game Theory

In recent years, as the E-commerce market booming, third-party payment industry as an important support goes into a geometric growth. With the enactment of "Non-financial institution payment service management approach" by the People’s Bank in 2010, China initially built the regulatory framework of third-party payment. May 2011, the issue of payment business license not only heralded that the third-party payment companies had a broader space for development, but also meant that China’s government would include the regulation of third-party payment companies in the formal regulatory system. How to regulate third-party payment agencies effectively has become the focus of attention. Third-party payment is an innovative method of payment, and proposes new requirement for the regulatory. Inadequate supervision or excessive regulation will hinder the third-party payment industry to develop healthfully. How to strike a balance between the two and achieve effective supervision become a new topic to the regulators.This paper starts from the current situation of third-party payment industry to identify the risk in the development, and proposes the significance of regulatory supervision. The paper also analyzes deficiencies of market supervision on third-party payment market, analyzes game relations between regulatory authorities and third-party payment institutions with game theory, and construct a regulatory model, and give advises for the effective regulatory of third-party payment.This paper is divided into five parts. Chapter one analyzes background and significance of the topic and summarizes relevant literature on third-party payment regulatory. Chapter two summarizes the current situation of third-party payment industry,and points out risks of third-party payment, and proposes the necessity of regulation on China’s third-party payment. Chapter three analyzes the current situation of regulation on third-party payment in US, EU and Asia from aspect of development, and analyzes the current situation and problems of third-party payment in China. Chapter four focuses on the game analysis of regulation on third-party payment market from respects of static game and dynamic game. Chapter five analyzes the game relationship between third-party payment agencies and regulatory authorities, bases on which establishes a agency model and gives advice for third-party payment regulation. Chapter six makes summary of the paper, giving the direction of the future research.