Relevance Study On China’s Listed Companies Executive Compensation And Financing Behaviors

With the continuous expansion of capital markets, the number of listed companies are increasing and the scale are becoming larger, the management of listed companies has become a hot issue which people pay keen attention to. Management’s compensation system as an important part of the corporate governance structure, has a great significance to optimize the allocation of resources, and ultimately maximize enterprise value. Management’s compensation is generally linked with corporate performance and scale, performance and scale of development and investment companies and closely related companies, while corporate investment also involves the corporate finance, whether listed companies financing behavior is rational and reasonable will directly affect the company capital listed structure and internal governance structure of rationality and operational efficiency, returns to shareholders. The financing behavior of listed companies plays an important role to improve the performance of essential expansion of the scale. Therefore, the level of executive compensation is largely influenced by the behavior of corporate finance, and the design and management compensation system relates to the capital structure when corporate need financing. So, this article focuses on the link of the listed company’s management remuneration and financing behavior.This paper reviews the literature on the relationship between the pay system and financing behavior at home and abroad.It’s based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital theory and the interests of the convergence hypothesis, it constitute the theoretical basis for the study. Then considerng our current listing situation of company’s management remuneration, in theory, I analyze its interaction with listed companies financing behavior. Using the data of Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies in the financial industry in 2014, I analyse it from three aspects: therelevance between the listed company’s management remuneration and financial performance of listed companies,the relevance between company’s management remuneration and listed companiy’s financing activities and the relevance of shareholding of listed companies and their financing behavior. The results showed that the financial sector listed companies pay to corporate performance management have some incentive, management remuneration and the proportion of executives holding are inversely correlated with the capital structure of assets and liabilities. Finally, on the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis of Chinese listed companies executive compensation system put forward recommendations accordingly.