Impact On The Enterprise Value Of Family-controlled Listed Companies In China

Both ancient and modern, as a form of business organization, whether in the emphasis on "family culture" of the East or or in the "contract culture" as the core of the West, family businesses have assumed an important role in national economic development and prosperity for the world economy has made important contributions.This article in Chinese families gather to look at listed companies, analyze the relationship between the family’s control and enterprise value.Research is the foundation of Western economic theory developed capital markets, which in the transition economies of Chinese family businesses, there must be a lot of discomfort place. Chinese family businesses coupled with specific cultural background, reasonable elements from Western economic theory as I used to study the Chinese family control and enterprise value would have significant research value.Based on the analysis of the Chinese family business governance structure, trying to answer the family control effective? The relationship between it and the enterprise value is what? This paper selects the 2013 GEM 90 family-controlled listed companies as samples taken normative and empirical research combined approach,the "dual agency theory" and the theory support, were established for each ownership structure, corporate governance structure and enterprise value of the regression model to study the impact of family-controlled enterprise value. While using ROA conduct robustness tests.Theoretical studies show that:(1) the existence of family listed companies controlled dual agency relationship, the first tier of the agency relationship is a conflict of interest between shareholders and outside the family shareholders, the second re-agency relationship is a conflict of interest with the family shareholders of professional managers; and then found that the core of family governance of listed companies are more inclined to the first tier of the agency relationship.(2) control of the zoom mechanism pyramid anchored study found that not only increased the family shareholders tunneling behavior of motivation and incentives, but also reduces the difficulty of tunnel excavation behavior. The family controlling shareholder proxy conflict with professional managers agency costs arising from the level of the enterprise in which the capital market, the extent of perfect justice, business development stage and social credit system-related penalty mechanism and otherenvironmental factors are closely related.The empirical results show: the cash flow rights and firm value is positively correlated; control rights and cash flow right degree of separation of the enterprise value has a significant negative effect; ownership concentration and firm value negatively correlated; outstanding shares and enterprise value positively correlated;family participation family management is not conducive to enhance corporate value;chairman and general manager of the enterprise value of the two grade-one has a negative effect. On the basis of these theoretical and empirical research, make some policy recommendations to promote our family of listed companies long-term healthy development.