Access To Information On The Effect Of Bank Credit Financing To Small And Medium Enterprises And Case Studies

SMEs has played an irreplaceable role in China’s social and economic. However,SME in our country faces a universal phenomenon is the financing difficulty. On the one hand, SME financing is due to be vulnerable to the influences of operating environment, which lead to higher investment risk. On the other hand, SME financing is due to the limited size of the SME assets, which lead to a lack of collateral and guarantees in the process of applying for loans. However, the main reason leading to the financing of SMEs is information asymmetry between banks and enterprises, specific features: in the financial markets, because SMEs lack the ability of financial system and information disclosure, banks can’t make effective risk measurement of SMEs. Under asymmetric information, as providers of funds, banks select prospective borrowers through interest rate, which likely to cause adverse selection in financial markets, and after obtaining the loan, it is more likely to generate moral hazard driven by financing costs and interest rates. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems make the banks face huge credit risk. Thus, from the perspective of risk control, banks will choose relatively large enterprises with more complete information and take credit rationing strategy for SMEs in the process of game between banks and enterprises.Therefore, we must firstly solve the problem of asymmetric information between banks and enterprises in order to solve the problem of SMEs financing. To solve this problem, this article explores the possibility and conditions of addressing the credit rationing of SMEs from the point of information acquisition. This article models the credit and financing behavior of SMEs, and analyzes how information acquisition eases the credit rationing in the case of asymmetric information between banks and enterprises. Then, this article finds some better and more effective ways to solve the SME financing with case discussions. Finally, this article gives some suggestions.Through theoretical analysis and case discussions, the main conclusions of this paper are as follows: To reduce the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises, banks should collect and collate the information of enterprise before the loan, and supervise the enterprise after the loan, which could maintain a long-term relationship between banks and enterprises, then invisible contracts can be reached and closer relations can be built, some enterprises can become the bank’s relationship-basedcustomers. In order to increase the availability of financing and reduce financing costs,enterprises should actively cooperate with the bank to obtain information, even actively disclose more information to the bank to reduce costs for banks and lower the bank’s interest rate requirements on loans, in the end, banks and enterprises can achieve win-win results.