Reseach On The Decision Model And Incentive Mechanism Under Confirmed Storage Financing

With the number of small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) growing, its impact on the national economy is increasingly important. However, for a long time, China’s SMEs generally have been faced with funding constraints and financing difficulties. To help out of the dilemma of SMEs’ financing, our government and financial institutions have made a lot of effort, but the effect is st ill unsatisfactory. Fortunately, confirming storage financing is one of the effective ways. In confirming storage financing business, logistics enterprises need to be involved in. On the surface, confirming storage financing business can create more value-added services and increase revenues for logistics enterprises. However, in actual operation, logistics enterprises as support-type instead of biggest gainers of confirming storage financing business are charged with management of goods, transport, storage, valuation and other critical work. Meanwhile, whether the valuation of goods is accurate or not will affect the bank’s loan proceeds. Thus, it requires banks to supervise and motivate logistics enterprises to protect their revenues practically. To make matters worse, there is little research on logistics enterprises incentive problems under the confirming storage financing mode theoretically to solve practical problems. Therefore, the study of this paper has great theoretical and practical significance.Firstly, we summarize and analyze the supply chain finance’s meaning and patterns, the status of current development in our country and related theories.Secondly, considering the manufacturers bearing call risks, we analyze revenue models of banks, manufactures and retailers under confirming storage financing mode. On the basis of revenue models, we get the optimal decisions under centralized and decentralized decision-making situations, and discuss the conditions under which the supply chain achieves coordination. Through numerical analysis, we verify the accuracy and scientificity of model derivations.Thirdly, in confirming storage financing mode, under the consideration of cooperation between banks and logistics enterprises for a single period, static agent game models are constructed under both symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. Through constraint programming approach, we obtain bank’s optimal incentive contract decisions and logistics enterprise’s effort levels. Studies have shown that: in single period static model, with symmetric information, banks tend to use fixed remuneration contract; with asymmetric information, banks tend to use non-fixed contract and need to pay the agency fee.Finally, in confirming storage financing mode, under the consideration of cooperation between banks and logistics enterprises over a long period of time and banks can adjust the current incentive coefficients according to the efforts of logistics enterprises in last period, dynamic agent game models are constructed under both symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. We obtain bank’s optimal incentive contract decisions and logistics enterprise’s effort levels as well. Studies have shown that: with symmetric information, banks will not adjust incentive coefficients and results are consistent with single-period models; with asymmetric information, banks will adjust the current incentive coefficients according to the efforts of logistics enterprises in last period. Numerical analysis shows that adjusting incentive coefficients dynamically is more favorable for banks.