Study On The Administrative Conflict About The Coordinated Development Of The Industry In Jing-Jin-Ji Region

With the development of regional economic has become a national economic development growth points, the cooperation of regional industry as a regional economic cooperation is an important way to make an important contribution to regional integration. Beijing Tianjin Hebei collaborative development has been a long-term social problems, but because of its endowed with special political significance is always difficult to break through the dilemma. Recently, Beijing Tianjin Hebei integration issues were raised to the national strategic level. Coupled with the increasingly serious problem of air pollution, the Beijing Tianjin Hebei region has attracted public attention in academic area, sparking a new round of discussions boom. In this paper, the problem of Beijing Tianjin Hebei collaborative industry as the research object, trying to facing the difficulties of development from the perspective of administrative conflicts of industrial cooperation and the analysis of its causes. And the introduction of cooperative game theory, analysis of how to build the Beijing Tianjin Hebei region of interests distribution mechanism. The main contents of this paper are as follows:First of all, this paper reviews the research progress and related theory of domestic and foreign scholars on industrial development, administrative conflict and cooperation game theory. Then we clarifying the research ideas based on the related theories. Secondly, we use the regional relative specialization index and regional specialization index to measure the Beijing Tianjin Hebei region industrial division of labor and the status of the industrial structure. Based on the empirical results, we sums up the problem about Beijing Tianjin Hebei industrial division and cooperation, and introduce the administrative conflict should be thought of administrative boundary barriers, industry collaboration with the dislocation of government functions, lack of coordination mechanisms and institutional barriers. In this area, we use the distribution of interests as the starting point, build a cooperative game model to analysis cooperative behavior of Beijing Tianjin Hebei and found that only a reasonable coordination mechanism of interests can ensure the stability and the overall strength of cooperative alliance. Finally, combined with the research results, this paper give the corresponding policy recommendations.