Game Research And Effects Analysis On Participatory Management Of Water Conservancy

Since1980s many countries and regions have been carried out legislation and practice workin farmers’ participatory water management. Through establishing the relevant policies, regulationsand the participatory marketing management systems they realized the participatory irrigationmanagement effectively. Their participatory irrigation management mainly method is to transferpart or all of the management right to farmers, and they complete the whole task by designing theeffective government legislation, the relevant continuation of responsibility system, the incentivemechanism and inspiring farmer participation. Due to the irrigation industry relations with thepeople’s livelihood, so the Chinese government attaches great importance to farmer participatorymanagement of water conservancy, and the government through establishing policies and exploring"management contract","joint stock","Water Users Association" and other forms of pilot testmeasures to study other countries participatory irrigation management mature experience andpractice to solve this problem. However, due to the special agricultural structure and traditionalirrigation thought and other special conditions of China, the farmer participatory irrigationmanagement effect in our country is not so ideal. Therefore, we need a in-depth study to find thekey problem of farmer participatory irrigation management to seek a viable solution for thegovernment, farmers and other stakeholders. So, based on the comprehensive discussion ofdomestic and foreign related research results, and combined with the current problems of china,such as the absence of government participatory, the market failure, the low level of farmers’participation, this paper by using the principal-agent theory, the Grey DEMATEL system theory,the dynamic evolutionary game theory to solve the key issues which have been identified.Firstly, this paper analyzes the main factors which restrict the farmer participatory watermanagement behaviors from two aspects (theory and empirical). Illustrated by the Case ofZhejiang，there are many constraints to explain why most of Chinese farmers do not want to join inthe irrigation management work at this stage, and there are many perplexing relationship exist inthese factors. Based on this, this paper uses the Grey DEMATEL method to analyze the restrictingfactors of these factors which influence farmers’ participation in irrigation management and byusing the-spot investigation method we make sure that this method is objective. The third chapterthrough the Grey DEMATEL method find out the main and key factors which affect farmers’participation in irrigation management are lacking of effective incentive and effective participatorymanagement of the market system, and this conclusion provides the basis for the construction ofSecurity system of effective participatory management. Secondly, this paper set up a government incentive oriented game model between governmentand farmer in water conservancy management. Because of the change of time resulted to thegovernment incentives have been changed, and there is an asymmetric information problemsexisted in the process of motivation between government and farmer, so the fourth chapter uses thedynamic evolutionary game theory to establish the dynamic evolutionary game model betweengovernment and farmers, and analyzes the different evolutionary stable strategies and the differentbehavior characteristics of their two in different stages, Based on this, a clear direction have beenpointed out to the government, which is the government should establish local laws, regulations,supporting standards, positive and negative incentive measures and perfect supervision mechanismto make sure the farmer participatory irrigation management smoothly.Finally, this paper establishes the incentive mechanism system. According to the analysisresults of the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter, the sixth chapter design the Security system fromfour aspects, which are the legal guarantee, organization guarantee, operation monitoring andcultural protection, and then describe a detailed sketch of the content and operation process ofdifferent Security types, and put forward effective Security system.