Correlation Analysis Of Ownership Structure、Equity Incentive And Company Performance

Principal agent problems caused by the separation of ownership and management rights of the Modern Corporation is the major problems faced by the corporate governance. In the principal-agent relationship, the shareholders of the company is pursuiting for the maximization of equity value. Because of "economic man", managers are pursuiting the maximization of their own interests. The target of owners and managers are different, so"the issue of corporate governance of moral hazard" and a series of problem will be occured. This requires the incentive and supervisive mechanism to restrict the behavior of the manager. The manager can consider more about the company’s overall interests when making decisions.This is also the basis of equity incentive, equity incentive has been applied more and more widely.Although more complex problems of governance have still exist in listed Companies, corporate governance mechanism has been continuously improved after continuous exploration of theory and practice. At the same time, more and more listed Companies have realized the importance of equity incentive and proposed to implemente the equity incentive for executives, assigned to apart of executive equity to this mannagers. However, the different companies adopt different equity incentive model. The company’s ownership structure and the restriction of domestic macroeconomic conditions are different. There is a big difference between the different effect of listing Corporation’s equity incentive. Therefore, we need to analyze whether the data according to the Sample Firms of equity incentive and equity structure will influence the company performance? How to influence corporate performance? The correlation research can not only enrich the principal-agent theory, incentive theory and the entrenchment effect and benefit the synergistic effect in theory, but also can be combined with the company’s equity incentive status, guide companies in the implementation of equity incentive plan, and change the environment of governance in company. According to "the introduction, literature review, theoretical analysis and assumptions, research design:An Empirical Analysis of the main conclusions and recommendations", this papar is divided into six parts. The six part of this paper is respectively as follows:The first part is introduction, mainly introduces the research background, the significance of this study, and puts forward the research ideas and innovation points of this paper.The second part is the literature review. Based on the domestic and foreign research about equity incentive and company performance and the relationshiop between ownership structure and company performance, how the research situation about this topic in academic, and point out its contributions and shortcomings after the literature was reviewed,.The third part is theoretical analysis and assumptions. this part put forward hypotheses based on the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, property rights theory and the theory of incentive compatibility and entrenchment effects and benefits ofsynergistic effects. At the sametime, Sample Firms and the domestic development status were described on the hypothesis of this research. This paper put forward a total of five hypotheses.The fourth part is the research design. First, construct an empirical model and corresponding hypothesis, according to the hypothesis of this study, with reference to the previous studies. This paper have five regression model. The two models reciprocal are for robustness test. Secondly, the method for selection of sample data, and list the relevant explanatory variables, explanatory variables and control variables.The fifth part is the empirical analysis. Based on the Chinese listing Corporation from2008to2013years, listing Corporation data from Shenzhen100Index constituent stocks and the Shang hai180Index constituent stocks were analyzed by descriptive statistics, principal component analysis, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis and robustness testing. The empirical analysis is for studing the relationship between the incentive, equity structure and company performance.The sixth part is the conclusion and suggestions. Through the above regression we can draw conclusions. Then puting forward specific suggestions according to the conclusions of the listed Companies.The empirical conclusion of this paper as follows:(1) the equity incentive is positively related to conpany performance. It is said that the implementation of equity incentive can upgrade to the company performance.(2) There is an inverted U relationship between the ownership concentration and the company performance, ownership balancing degree is positively correlated with company performance.(3) for equity property, the marginal effect of non-state ultimate controlling equity incentive is higher.(4) for different groups of samples of the proportion of the largest shareholders, correlation between Equity incentive and company performance is not the same. Only the proportion of the first big shareholder is in [20%,50%], regression coefficient of Equity incentive and company performance is significant at the1%level.The innovation of this paper lies in adding cross term of ownership and shareholding in model design. The principal component analysis method was more objective measure for company performance. Using group test in testing the Correlation between equity incentive and company performance. Robustness tests is necessary in order to avoid the endogeneity of ownership concentration degree.